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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the long debate 
over North Carolina's capital site, the motives and 
considerations applied in the debate, and the significance 
of the debate in the context of North Carolina's larger 
political situation.
State government records, newspapers, private 
correspondence, and secondary historical sources are used 
to examine the nature of the debate. The capital debate in 
North Carolina began in 1676 with the first attempts to 
establish a seat of government in the northern part of the 
province of Carolina. The debate did not finally end until 
1791, when officials selected a site, later named Raleigh, 
as the new seat of government.
The issues of convenience, healthy situation, and 
economic advantage influenced this debate. Concerns for a 
healthy, convenient capital site became less pronounced 
after the American Revolution while economic motivation 
developed to a greater degree during that time.
Sectionalism proved to be a constant factor in the 
debate from 1730 through the capital's final settlement in 
1791. The changing pattern of sectionalism in the capital 
debate illustrated both the diminishing importance of 
convenience and the growing significance of economic 
issues. The maturing of North Carolina's trade system 
enabled new, conflicting sectional alliances to develop and 
fight bitterly over the choice of the capital site. 
Officials often used the capital debate as a tool to 
maneuver other more significant sectional issues.
"THE MOST PROPER AND CONVENIENT PLACE"
THE DEBATE OVER NORTH CAROLINA'S SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, 1676-1791
CHAPTER I
"SOME FITTING PLACE"
THE SEARCH FOR A CAPITAL, 1676-1730
Jonathan Urmstone was bitter and frustrated. His role 
as an Anglican minister in the province of North Carolina 
was a difficult task in 1711, made even more trying because 
the provincials were witholding from him useful (and 
valuable) books which would greatly aid his work. The 
Reverend Doctor Thomas Bray of England had brought the 
library to Bath Town, under the mistaken belief— so 
Urmstone contended— that the town was North Carolina's 
capital. In numerous letters to the Society for Propagating 
the Gospel, Urmstone lamented the refusal of "that famous 
city of Bath consisting of 9 houses or rather cottages" to 
release the books. Deriding the town as "a remote, obscure, 
dangerous place" and one that was "inconsistent with any 
other part of the Colony", he pronounced in 1712, "That 
place will never be the seat of Government."1 In one sense 
Urmstone1 s prophecy came true: Bath Town was never North
Carolina's official capital. Paradoxically, he was also 
wrong, for on several occasions the town was indeed used as 
the seat of government. Although the proprietors who ruled 
North Carolina until 1729 rejected Bath as a possible 























their sale of the province to the English crown, the royal 
government began moving back and forth between several 
towns, including Bath.
The period of itinerent government has been described by 
A. Roger Ekirch in his book, "Poor Carolina11: Politics and
Society in Colonial North Carolina. 1729-1776. and, to a 
lesser extent, by Hugh Talmage Lefler and Albert Ray 
Newsome in North Carolina: History of a Southern State.
Ekirch, Lefler, and Newsome properly ascribed the lack of a 
permanent seat of government between 17 36 and 17 65 to a 
sectional dispute between northern and southern regions 
over travel convenience and economic advantage.2 The 
location of the capital, however, was merely one part of the 
sectional controversy, which also revolved around equal 
assembly representation and the payment of land taxes 
called quitrents.
Neither Ekirch nor Lefler and Newsome analyzed the 
changing importance of the seat of government issue to the 
larger regional squabble. Perhaps more important, both 
works included only minimal background information on North 
Carolina's seat of government before 1736. Ekirch began 
"Poor Carolina" with the colony's change from proprietary 
to royal status in 1729, but he did mention the proprietary 
capital of Edenton. Lefler and Newsome began their history 
of North Carolina with the first European explorations of 
the region, but only noted twice that an "unofficial"
5 .
capital existed before the sectional controversy began. In 
the more recent Colonial North Carolina: A History. Lefler
and William S. Powell make no mention of the original seat 
of government.3
In actuality, by 17 3 6 North Carolina had enjoyed an 
official capital for at least fourteen years. The Lords 
Proprietors desired a seat of government for the northern 
part of Carolina as early as 1676, and chose Edenton in 
172 2. North Carolina's government took on its itinerant 
nature when growth of settlement south of the Albemarle 
region arroused discontent with the location of the 
original capital as well as sectional disagreement over the 
location of a new seat of government. The southern faction 
made a bold attempt to establish New Bern as the official 
capital in 1746, after which the capital temporarily lost 
importance as a sectional issue even though the controversy 
between regions continued. In 1754 the royal authorities 
refused to recognize New Bern as the official capital, thus 
making North Carolina's seat of government again an 
unsettled matter. The capital would remain unsettled until 
New Bern achieved official status as the chief city in 1765. 
Eventually, the American Revolution would again unsettle 
the seat of government and launch the new state into yet 
another period of governmental itinerancy and political 
intrigue over the location of the state capital.
6 .
Permanent European settlement of North Carolina 
(excluding the settlement of Roanoke Island in 1587) 
probably began in the mid-seventeenth century. At that 
time, settlers began drifting down to the Albemarle Sound 
region from Virginia (see Map 1) . In 163 3 eight Lords 
Proprietors received a royal charter for the region called 
"Carolina", which lay between Florida and Virginia. 
Instructions to the governor and council in 167 6 gave the 
first evidence that the Lords Proprietors desired a seat of 
government for the northern part of Carolina, called 
"Albemarle". The instructions urged fortified settlement 
of the south side of Albemarle Sound and the establishment 
of three towns to serve as ports for Albemarle County. The 
first of the three towns was to be "upon Roanoke Island 
which wee will have bee the Chiefe towne and the place for 
the Councell and assembly to meete".4
Three years later the Lords Proprietors clearly 
expressed their desire for a capital in northern Carolina 
in their instructions "to John Hearvey Esqr. President and 
the Councell of the County of Albemerle in the Province of 
Carolina". The Proprietors had appointed Seth Sothel as 
governor of Albemarle in 1678. John Harvey, president of 
the council, governed the county while Turkish captors 
detained Sothel in Algiers. John Jenkins succeeded Harvey 
as governor until Sothel finally arrived in 1683.5
7 .
Although Harvey's instructions, unlike those of 1676,
did not specify an actual location for the capital, they did
state that the seat of government should be in an
appropriate site:
You are to choose some fitting place in a 
Collony whereon to builde the Cheefe towne 
of Albemarle in the Choice of which place 
you are to have Regarde to health [, ] plenty 
and Easy Access, you are to endeavor to get 
the Parliament to Raise wherewithal 1 to 
build a house for the meating of the 
Councell and Parliament in the said towne 
and when the Said house is erected the 
Councell and Parliament are always to Sitt 
there and also the Surveyors Registers and 
Secretarys offices are there to be kept and 
in no other place and also the Court of 
Common please and Sessions of the 
peace. . . ,6
The Proprietors certainly had no intention of fostering an 
itinerant government.
The instructions to Harvey not only indicated the 
Proprietors' intentions for a seat of government, but also 
set forth principles that would dominate the selection of a 
capital throughout the eighteenth century. A "fitting 
place" with "plenty and easy access" denoted convenience— a 
town to which inhabitants and British vessels could easily 
travel. The Proprietors were also concerned for a healthy 
site for they knew well that areas around the Albemarle and 
Pamlico Sounds could be harmful. Also, the instructions 
illustrated that, though the choice of a capital site was a 
matter of royal prerogative, the assembly's approval of the 
choice was necessary for the funding of government
8 .
buildings. Furthermore, efficient government required a 
fixed location for records, offices, and officials. All 
these factors would later influence the eighteenth-century 
debates concerning the seat of government.
Harvey's instructions also introduced economic 
considerations: "and you are to get the Parliament to pass
an Act that noe Store Shall be kept Strong Drink or any 
goods Sould by Retayle but in the Said Towne and you are to 
cause all vessells that shall come into Albemarle River 
there to Loade and Unloade as by our Fundamentall 
Constitutions is Required".7 Acts limiting retail goods 
and alcohol to the capital went unenforced in the 
eighteenth century; nevertheless, a capital site's 
economic advantages were as obvious to the Proprietors as 
they would be to sectional factions after 1736. Ekirch 
explained that, "inevitably, the establishment of a 
permanent seat of government would bring new men and new 
money to the designated town and its environs".8 
Furthermore, the capital would be a port, and Carolina's 
unenforced Fundamental Constitutions, written by John 
Locke in 1669, declared that the first port on a river would 
"be a port town forever" and would have a monopoly on 
trade.9
The Lords Proprietors repeated these designs for a 
capital in the 1681 instructions to Captain Henry 
Wilkinson, "Governor of That Part of the Province of
9 .
Carolina that Lyes 5. Miles Southe of the River of Pemplico 
[Pamlico] and From Thence to Virginia". The Proprietors 
announced Wilkinson's appointment as governor, replacing 
John Jenkins, in the hope that a stranger to the Carolinians 
would be able to examine the province's troubled past and 
"doe equal justice to all partyes".10 The published 
Colonial Records give no more mention of Captain 
Wilkinson's administration, but Charles M. Andrews has 
described the financial troubles and imprisonment which 
prevented this governor from travelling to North Carolina.11 
Though the lords instructed in vain, they stressed the 
importance of a capital in their plans for the colony.
The Proprietors reiterated their intentions for 
establishing a capital in private instructions to Governor 
Philip Ludwell in 1691: "You are to use yor uttmost
endeavor to make a setlemt of a Towne remote from the Sea to 
be hereafter the seat of the Govern^."12 Quite likely the 
Proprietors, in this latter instruction, feared unhealthy 
situations near the sounds, yet distance from the sea would 
not greatly affect "plenty and easy access" as long as the 
river of the chosen site was not too shallow for deep-draft 
ships.
Despite early plans for a capital, towns did not develop 
in North Carolina until the early eighteenth century. The 
first town, Bath, established in 1706, actually developed 
on the Pamlico River, south of the center of population
10
around the Albemarle region (see Map 1) . Governor John 
Harvey organized the area around the Pamlico and Neuse 
Rivers as Bath County in 1696, and the county was divided in 
1705 into Pamlico, Wickham, and Archdale counties. Bath 
Town, located in Pamlico County (later renamed Beaufort 
County) received no praise from Jonathan Urmstone who 
considered it in 1711 to be "the most inconsiderable place 
in the country". His opinion, however, surely reflected 
his problems with acquiring Dr. Bray's library, and his 
letters show him to be a constant complainer on many 
subjects. Sandra Tyler Wood has stated that "the lack of 
dependable financial help given by the inhabitants tainted 
Mr. Urmstone's whole outlook on North Carolina".13
William Gordon, an earlier Anglican minister, gave a 
more objective description of Bath in 1709. He commented on 
the smallness of the town— only twelve houses— and its 
inablility to upport a minister, but then conceded "it is 
not the unpleasantest part of the country— nay, in all 
probability it will be the center of trade, as having the 
advantage of a better inlet for shipping, and surrounded 
with most pleasant savannas, very useful for stocks of 
cattle". In 1716 Governor Charles Eden made Bath an 
official port, yet the town never grew to any significant 
degree. New Bern, a near neighbor, soon eclipsed it.14
In 1710 Baron Christoph Von Graffenried founded New Bern 
south of Bath at the juncture of the Neuse and Trent Rivers.
11.
Upon arriving in North Carolina, Von Graffenried discovered 
that the land he had bought was not a choice site. John 
Lawson, his surveyor, placed the settlers "on the south 
side of this point of land along the Trent River, in the 
very hottest and most unhealthy position, instead of toward 
the north, on the Neuse River, where they could have been 
better placed and in a more healthy locality". New Bern's 
unhealthy location was a subject of lament throughout 
eighteenth- century discussions of the location of a 
capital, and in 1765, an unknown French traveller 
graphically described the unhealthy and unpleasant nature 
of the town. Although the Frenchman cited all of Carolina 
as unhealthy, he suspected lowness of land to be a chief 
cause and attributed New Bern's specific condition to "the 
stagnateing waters of these great rivers where there is no 
tide or Curent but what is occasioned by the winds. [I]n 
hot Calm Days youl see a thick scum on the waters, which 
occasions a disagreeable stench".15
Thomas Alonzo Dill has questioned the unhealthiness of 
New Bern's situation in a series of articles on the 
eighteenth-century town. According to Dill, if the site 
had been as unhealthy as Von Graffenried claimed, "an able 
frontiersman like Lawson would hardly have chosen this spot 
for his own dwelling". Dill also noted that Von Graffenried 
chose practically the same site to rebuild the town, later 
praising the situation.16 In mentioning naturalist John
12 .
Brickell's descriptions of North Carolina towns, Dill 
stated that "like every other eighteenth-century writer, 
Brickell admired 'the pleasant Prospect' of New Bern on its 
two rivers". While there is merit in Dill's questioning of 
Von Graffenried's statement, Brickell*s praise of New Bern 
has little significance when compared to his descriptions 
of other North Carolina towns. Brickell described Edenton, 
Bath, and Brunswick as "pleasently seated", the former two 
having "delightful Prospects" on their rivers. New Bern 
and Beaufort both had "pleasant Prospects". Dill did quote 
without refutation the French traveller's comments on the 
unhealthiness of New Bern, thus conceding to some degree a 
poor reputation of health for the eighteenth-century town, 
a reputation which would affect its consideration as a 
capital site throughout the century.17
Von Graffenried's settlement was almost completely 
demolished by the Tuscarora War in 1711. Although it 
received greater proportionate damage than did Bath Town,
New Bern quickly recovered, growing larger than the earlier 
town and receiving a greater share of the trade. Yet, North 
Carolina officials chose neither Bath nor New Bern as the 
seat of government. Possibly, Bath's lack of growth and New 
Bern's unhealthy situation influenced that decision.
Another factor may mistakenly seem to have been 
accessibility from England: although the lower Neuse and
Pamlico Rivers were quite navigable, Ocracoke Inlet, the
13 .
passageway through the Outer Banks, allowed no ships that 
drew more than ten feet of water. Neither navigation nor 
health, however, was a factor in the decision, for Edenton, 
the town actually chosen as the seat of government, used 
Ocracoke Inlet in lieu of the more dangerous, though
nearer, Roanoke Inlet, and also had a reputation as an
• 18 •unhealthy site. Rather, centrality of location was the
dominating influence on the choice of an early capital.
Despite the early growth of towns in the Neuse-Pamlico
region, the majority of North Carolina's population— and
most of its leaders— resided around the more northern
Albemarle Sound. The desire for a capital easily
accessible to the population— the Proprietors' early
intention— would also play a major role in debates after
1736.
An effort to establish a seat of government occurred in 
1715 with a law to build an assembly house and courthouse at 
the forks of Queen Anne' s Creek in the Chowan Precinct on 
the Albemarle Sound. The site also hosted Governor Charles 
Eden's residence and was incorporated as Edenton in 1722.
An act of 1722 for "Enlarging and Encouragement of the Town 
called Edenton" clarified the role of the new town as a seat 
of government, requiring various "publick officers under 
the penalty of five pounds p'r Month to keep their Several 
and respective Offices by themselves or Sufficient Deputies 
within the Said Town of Edenton". Although an assembly
14
house was never built there, Edenton continued as North 
Carolina's seat of government after the end of proprietary 
rule in 1729; the town was the sole location for council 
meetings until 1734 and for assembly meetings until 1736. 
John Brickell noted that in 17 3 7 Edenton had been the "Seat 
of the Governors for many Years".19
Historians have offered different interpretations of 
Edenton as capital of North Carolina. According to Lefler 
and Newsome, Edenton was only an unofficial seat of 
government. Enoch Lawrence Lee noted in his history of the 
lower Cape Fear region that Edenton "sometimes served as 
the seat of provincial government though it was not 
officially designated the capital of the province". Samuel
A'Court Ashe, however, described the town as "the
• 20 • • •established seat of government". Some differentiation may
have been drawn, at least on Lee's part, between a seat of 
government and a capital. "Capital" was rarely used to 
describe a chief city for North Carolina until the end of 
the eighteenth century, for even in the debate after the 
American Revolution, "seat of government" was used rather 
than "capital". In such discussions throughout that 
century— and even before— the desire was clearly for a 
capital in the modern sense, which is indeed a seat of 
government. Thus Alonzo Dill rightly swept away any 
differentiation when he wrote that in 1722 "Edenton had 
been made the seat of certain provincial officers and of the
governor if he so chose; and thus in a legal sense but more 
strongly in a customary sense the town was the capital of 
North Carolina". No act required courts to meet there, but 
"Edenton was indeed the capital if by capital one meant the 
seat of the governor and, more important, the meeting place 
of the assembly".21
As the first capital of North Carolina, Edenton was
representative of the slow growth of towns in the province.
William Byrd described the place in his 1728 "History of the
Dividing Line". Byrd accentuated the underdevelopment of
North Carolina in relation to his native Virginia, and
though the unpleasant work of surveying the border between
the two colonies colored his views, his description of the
young capital is insightful:
This Town is Situate on the North side of 
Albemarle Sound, which is there about 5 
miles over. A Dirty Slash runs all along 
the Back of it, which in the Summer is a 
foul annoyance, and furnishes abundance of 
that Carolina plague, musquetas. There 
may be 40 or 50 Houses, most of them Small, 
and built without Expense. A Citizen here 
is counted Extravagant, if he has Ambition 
enough to aspire to a Brick-Chimney.
Justice herself is but indifferently 
Lodged, the Court-House having much the 
Air of a Common Tobacco-House. I believe 
this is the only Metropolis in the 
Christian or Mahometan World, Where there 
is neither Church, Chappel, Mosque,
Synagogue, or any other Place of Publick 
Worship of any Sect of Religion whatever.22
The Reverend Urmstone might have agreed completely with
Byrd's description, though Edenton was even larger than
Urmstone's Bath.
16 .
The Moravian Bishop Augustus Spangenberg also commented
on both the smallness and unhealthy situation of Edenton,
though at a later period, during his 1752 trip through the
province. Spangenberg noted that "Edenton is said to be one
of the oldest towns of America, but it is hardly one quarter
so large as Germantown [Pennsylvania], though it is well
situated on a rather large Sound". By Edenton's good
situation, the bishop must have meant its view or access to
navigation, for he lamented the site's unhealthiness:
All this section of North Carolina lies 
low, and there is much water, fresh and 
stagnant, which breeds fever every year, 
and many die from it. . . .We believe’that 
we caught the fever in Edenton and brought 
it with us, for there is so much fever in 
that town that hardly anyone gets through a 
year without an attack. It lies low, 
surrounded by water, which has neither ebb 
nor flow on account of the sandbanks, which 
lie between North Carolina and the sea, and 
hinder the tide.23
Edenton and New Bern were to share more than a seat of
government; they both shared unhealthy conditions for their
residents.
Though unhealthy and slow-growing, Edenton was the 
official seat of government during the 1720's and early 
1730's. The town's tenure as captal was brief, for new 
forces began pulling North Carolina's governmental 
workings away from the Albemarle after 1734. A new locus of 
settlement in the Cape Fear region, separated from Edenton 
by some 150 miles and several river crossings, made the 
location of the seat of government inconvenient for a
growing number of North Carolinians (see Map 1) . The 
existence of two vastly separated and competing centers of 
growth also hightened the significance of economic 
advantage associated with a capital site. As some Cape Fear 
settlers attained sufficient political power to challenge 
Albemarle assemblymen on significant sectional issues, it 
is not surprising that such discord included the location 
of the capital.
18 .
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CHAPTER II
"A GREAT INCONVENIENCE AND CHARGE": THE SEAT
OF GOVERNMENT DURING THE EARLY ROYAL PERIOD, 1729-1754
Edenton functioned as North Carolina's capital as early 
as 172 2. Shortly thereafter settlement in the lower Cape 
Fear Valley began which would eventually affect Edenton's 
status as a seat of government. The lower Cape Fear lay in 
the southeastern region of North Carolina, called 
"Clarendon County" by the Proprietors, a region closed to 
settlement since 1667. Lefler and Newsome attributed the 
settlement restriction to the area's dangerous coastline, 
the threat of Indian attack, and the greater value placed in 
more northern regions. After settlers began arriving in 
the area, George Burrington, as proprietary governor, 
reopened the area's land office. The southern settlement 
contrasted with the earlier settlement of Albemarle by 
quickly establishing its first town, Brunswick.1
Maurice Moore laid out and named Brunswick after 
receiving a large grant of land on the west bank of the Cape 
Fear River. The assembly declared the site a township in 
1729 and mentioned it an address to Governor George 
Burrington in 1731. "We understand there is a town already 
Established on Cape Fear River," they explained, "and we 
are informed it is like to be a flourishing place Reason of
20 .
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its Excellent Situation for the Trade of those Parts." 
Indeed, Brunswick did have a better entrance for ships than 
the more northerly ports. The assembly then made a 
statement which was perhaps ominous for the new town; it 
offered assistance to promote Brunswick "or any other Place 
on that River that shall be judged more proper".2
Another "Place on that River" developed shortly 
thereafter. The village of Newton was founded sixteen 
miles above Brunswick, and a 173 9 law erected it into the 
town of Wilmington.3 However, in 1740, a movement by 
Brunswick interests to repeal the Wilmington law produced a 
factional struggle. The Brunswick group argued that "many 
People did undertake to build and actually built, several 
good Houses, and made great improvements in and about the 
said Town [Brunswick] some years before the Village of 
Newton was erected", and claimed that the Wilmington law 
"would be attended with great injustice, in as much as it 
deprives those persons of the fruits of their labour and 
expense". A crucial point to their cause was that water 
depth and navigation at Brunswick were "notoriously known 
to be superior to those of Newton". The Wilmington faction 
conceded that the banks below Brunswick allowed ships of 
two feet greater draft than did Wilmington's banks, but 
emphasized Wilmington's "healthy Scituation and fine 
Springs". Moreover, they claimed Brunswick to be "the most 
sickly unhealthy place in the whole Colony", owing to its
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"unwholesome Water and the Pernicious Vapours rising from 
the Ponds and Marshes with which it is almost Surrounded".4 
The law incorporating Wilmington withstood attack, and the 
newer town quickly surpassed Brunswick in size and trade.
The settlement of the lower Cape Fear region did not 
immediately affect North Carolina's seat of government.
While George Burrington served as royal governor from 1731 
to 1734, the council, assembly, and general court continued 
to meet in Edenton. This stability, however, concealed a 
desire on the part of Governor Burrington and his council to 
remove the seat of government from Edenton. Whereas 
formerly the governor resided in the Albemarle region, 
Burrington had moved near the Cape Fear River. As early as 
1725, Burrington possessed a grant of five thousand acres 
on the Cape Fear and later built a plantation near 
Brunswick. Thus Edenton was no longer convenient to the 
governor. This fact worried many freeholders from Bertie, 
Edgecombe, and Craven precincts (see Map 1) . These 
precincts lay on different river systems northeast of the 
Cape Fear River, and would thus compete with more recent 
development to the south. In April 1773 a total of 420 
Bertie men petitioned Governor Burrington concerning the 
capital:
[T]here is a Discourse among us that you 
design to move the Seat of Government to 
the lower part of Cape Fear River which if 
done will prove a great inconvenience and 
Charge to four parts of the Inhabitants out 
of Five. We are sensible for many 
reasons Edenton is a very inconvenient
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Place for the Seat of Government and much 
more may be said against the settling it at 
Cape Fear River.
Therefore we humbly desire and hope Your 
Excellency will take proper measures for 
fixing the Seat of Government near the 
Centre of the Province which we suppose is 
between Tar and Neuse River which will give 
a general Satisfaction to almost the whole 
Province and greatly promote the Speedy 
peopling of the unsettled part of this 
Country. . . .
The 110 petitioners from Edgecombe made basically the same 
request, as did 2 69 from Craven, though the latter— being 
further south— supposed the center of the province to be 
"on the South side of Neuse River".5 Burrington did not 
move the capital anywhere, though the records are silent as 
to the petitioners' influence on his inaction. The 
requests do show, however, that thoughts of moving the seat 
of government from Edenton occurred at several levels of 
the political framework before the period of itinerant 
government began in November 1734.
The change of governorship that November took place 
rather dramatically. November 6, Burrington called an 
assembly in Edenton and was having some degree of success 
with the representatives— an unusual circumstance— when on 
the thirteenth he heard the proclamation that Governor 
Gabriel Johnston had published his commission in a council 
meeting on the Cape Fear. Not only did this event mark the 
end of an unsuccessful and frustrating governorship, but it 
also marked the end of Edenton's monopoly of provincial 
meetings. In November and December of 17 3 4 the councils met
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in Brunswick and New Hanover (the precinct including the 
lower Cape Fear region) . The following year, the council 
shifted between Edenton, Newton, New Bern, and Bath, and 
then continued to shift between these four towns and 
Brunswick for the next twelve years. The general assembly 
also moved between New Bern, Edenton, Bath, and Wilmington 
from 1736 to 1747.6
Motivated by the new Cape Fear settlement, agitation for 
a new capital fostered the development of an itinerant 
government in the 1730's and 1740's. The movement to 
disestablish Edenton as capital possessed an influential 
spokesman in Governor Burrington's successor, Gabriel 
Johnston. In a list of orders sent by Johnston to the Board 
of Trade in 1736, he complained, "[t]hat as the holding all 
the Courts particularly that of Chancery where all the 
Members of his Majesty's Council are oblidged to attend at a 
Place so near the extremity of the Province as Edenton is 
found to be by experience very inconvenient". Johnston 
requested that the court of chancery, consisting of the 
governor and council, be held at New Bern, "at present the 
most central place of the Province", and that council 
members be obligated to attend. Johnston further desired 
to "remove the other Courts to Newbern" and that "all other 
offices be for the future kept in the said Town of Newbern.
Any Law Custom or Usage to the Contrary notwithstanding". 
Governor Johnston, in a letter accompanying this order
explained his request to the Board of Trade:
The 7th Article your Lordships will find 
very reasonable if you please to consider 
that Edenton is within thirty miles of the 
Virginia line and Two hundred miles 
distant from Cape Fear where most of the 
council have their Habitations and 
Newberne is much nearer the center of the 
Province. I have not been able to hold 
above two Courts of Chancery since I came 
into the Province upon this account. If 
there is any Law confining the Courts to 
Edenton it is more than I know but if there 
is it was never confirmed by the Lords 
Propietors. . . .7
Early in 1744 the governor continued this theme in an
address to the council and assembly. Declaring that it was
"high time" to think seriously of "a proper arid convenient
place for holding his Majesties Courts, for fixing the
publick Offices and transacting the Business of the
Colony", Johnston poignantly stated his case:
When all the parts of this Province except 
such as were contiguous to the Virginia 
Line was but thinly inhabited, when your 
dealings were but small and navigation 
inconsiderable, when the soil of the whole 
province was the property of the Crown, 
there was then no great hardships in 
continuing the seat of Government where it 
has been for several years past[,] in 
allowing the Officers to keep the publick 
Records in their private Houses and giving 
their attendance twice or thrice in a year.
. . But now Gent when the Province is 
peopled quite up to the head of Peedee 
River which was formerly reconed in South 
Carolina[, ]a when the number of the people 
towards that Colony are so much 
increased [, ] when your commerce and 
navigation are so considerable augmented 
and so large a portion of the Lands in the 
Neighbourhood of Virginia are no longer 
his Majesties property.9
In these circumstances it is highly 
necessary to appoint a place nearer the
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centre of the Country where his Majesties'
Courts may be held[, ] where Offices may be 
built for keeping the publick registers 
and Officers obliged to give constant 
attendance for the dispatch of Business 
without hurry or confusion.10
Johnston's argument concerning the seat of government 
contained two main thrusts. With his call for a central 
location for the capital, the governor invoked the old 
factors of "plenty and easy access" both for North 
Carolinians and for navigation from outside the colony— "a 
proper and convenient place". His motivations may have 
been genuine desire for practicality and personal 
convenience for himself and his council, rather than for 
economic gain; his major landholdings lay in the Cape Fear 
region, not on the Neuse River or in the Albemarle region. 
Ulterior motives for economic gain, however, were more 
plausible. Johnston spoke of moving courts and offices to 
New Bern, but he secretly hoped to move the seat of 
government to the Cape Fear region. Upon Wilmington's 
incorporation he wrote in a private letter, "In a year or 
two I hope to get all the Publick Business done there 
[Wilmington] . But this must be done by degrees." Success 
at moving the capital to New Bern would facilitate an 
eventual move to Wilmington. Such an event would not only 
be convenient for him and his council, but would also be an 
economic boon for them as landholders.11
Johnston's desire for "fixing the publick Offices" and 
the concern for less confusion meant a single location for
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the seat of government— a desire also shared by the 
Proprietors in 1681. Johnston expounded on this second 
thrust of his argument in an address to the council and 
assembly later in 1744. "One great cause of all these 
misfortunes is the want of a fixed place for the dispatch of 
publick business. It is impossible to finish any matter as 
it ought to be while we go on in this intinerant way." He 
then concluded, "We have now tried every Town in the Colony 
and it is high time to settle somewhere."12
In complaining of itinerant government, Johnston 
reacted to a situation he himself helped develop by his 
active efforts to move the seat of government from Edenton. 
The governor determined the assembly’s meeting place, and 
after 173 6, the assembly consistently met in various towns. 
Both the governor and the majority of the council—  
representatives of royal authority— were associated with 
the Cape Fear region and desired a more southerly seat of 
government. Why did they not, then, establish a fixed seat 
of government more favorable to their location? Why did 
Johnston perceive a need to work by "degrees"? Though the 
choice of the capital site was a matter of royal 
prerogative, Johnston knew, as did the Proprietors in 1681, 
that the popularly elected assembly had to agree to the 
location because the assembly controlled the funds to 
finance public buildings. Johnston slyly understated his 
dependence on the assembly in a 1744 address: "I am
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sensible I have it in my power to settle this point with the 
advice of his Majestic's Council, but I assure you I cannot 
without great regret determine a matter that is of so much 
consequence to every man in the Province without your 
consent and concurrence which I shall always be glad to be 
guided by."13
Johnston needed the assembly's approval for a capital
site, and although most of the council had their
"Habitations" in the Cape Fear region, the majority of the
assembly did not. A law dating from 1670 allowed five
counties in the Albemarle region to send five delegates
each to the assembly, Bertie County three, and other
counties only two. This distribution created a majority
representation for Albemarle interests. The testimony of
Katherine Rutledge of New Bern, who, with her husband, had
kept a "House of Entertainment" in 1739 frequented by
Albemarle representatives, illustrated both the
representatives' use of the northern majority and their
view on the capital issue:
[S]he understood that the Assembly was 
broke up by means of some of the Members 
withdrawing and absconding in the Bushes 
from whence it was usually called the Bush 
assembly. And that she often heard the 
assemblymen that used their House talk 
that they would not consent to the removing 
the Publick Business or the seat of 
Government from Edenton.14
Albemarle assemblymen thus countered Governor Governor
Johnston's attempts to create a new official capital. It is
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possible that some men from Albemarle desired a centralized 
seat of government rather than the possible risk of a 
capital at Wilmington, as the Bertie petitioners did in 
173 3. Such an attempt was not formalized again until 174 6, 
but until that time the governor, by calling assembly and 
council meetings away from Edenton, succeeded in 
dislocating the seat of government in practice if not in 
theory.
By 1746, the Albemarle representatives had compromised
on the issue of a new seat of government, agreeing to a more
southerly location. At New Bern in June, the assembly
passed a bill to fix the place for the seat of government at
Bath Town, located on the Pamlico River just south of the
Albemarle region (see Map 1) . The council, which served as
the upper house of legislature, returned the bill to the
assembly with several amendments, stating that "the Place
for Establishing the General Court etc" they "must insist
to be New Bern instead of Bath". New Bern lay just north of
the Cape Fear region, on the Neuse River. John Wynns, of
Bertie County (Albemarle) described the situation in a
later testimony:
[T]he Council thereupon sent a Message to 
the House of Burgesses insisting that they 
should strike out Bath Town and incert 
Newbern in the room thereof. . . upon which 
the Question was put in the House of 
Burgesses and was carried in the 
Negative [, ] whereupon the Assembly was by 
his Excellency the Governor prorogued to 
Wilmington to meet in November. . . Mr.
[Matthew] Rowan [a council member] said 
that unless the Burgesses would consent to
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fix the seat of Government at Newbern they 
might depend there would be no Business 
done, for tho' the Majority of the 
Burgesses lived at the North, the Council 
were at the South, and they could put a 
Negative.15
Thus, the northern and southern factions— roughly the 
assembly majority versus the governor and council— were 
stubbornly divided between the sites of Bath and New Bern. 
The governor had the right to prorogue, or postpone, an 
assembly to meet again at any other place. Johnston, seeing 
that the Albemarle faction had matched his forces on the 
capital issue prorogued the assembly to meet in November at 
Wilmington. He hoped the Albemarle representatives would 
be unable— or would simply refuse— to travel such a long 
distance, thus giving his interests control of the 
assembly.
In "Poor Carolina” Ekirch gave much attention to this 
regional division. He observed the break "occurring 
roughly just beneath the six counties bordering Albemarle 
Sound". Ekirch attributed the gap to differing urban 
centers and trade outlets as well as differences in 
commodities and slave labor. Major sectional issues 
included the establishment of equal assembly 
representation and a new, fairer policy of land taxation, 
both of which the northern faction opposed. Although 
regional conflict occurred in other British North American 
colonies, Ekirch claimed that only in North Carolina did 
the conflict result in attempts to upset traditional
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governing systems. He saw the cause of this development in 
basic political conditions and attitudes— fragile 
institutional authority, indifference to government, and 
the lack of a responsible ruling group.16 Thus, the 
north/south controversy actually had a much larger scope 
than simple disagreement over the seat of government.
What, then, was the seat of governments importance to 
the larger sectional clash? In June 174 6 the issue seemed 
of paramount importance, for it brought hostility between 
the groups to a climax in the Wilmington prorogation. The 
issue which provoked this stand-off and Johnston's severe 
action was neither tax reform nor representation; rather it 
was a choice for a capital— between two towns only thirty 
miles apart. A severe confrontation on such an issue would 
be understandable if the two factions represented the towns 
involved, yet the great majority of these hostile groups 
were from neither New Bern nor Bath. The seeming importance 
of the issue, however, may be misleading, for Johnston had 
tried a similar tactic in 1741 over a stand-off on 
quitrents. The greatest motivation for the stubborn stands 
on the capital issue would seem to be convenience. Although 
New Bern and Bath were close, they were connected by two 
ferries, one two miles and the other four. In a letter to 
the Board of Trade discussing the site for a capital, Arthur 
Dobbs, Johnston's successor, implied that in North Carolina 
the ferries were unpleasant additions to a trip and should
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be avoided if possible.17 The Albemarle representatives may 
have refused to accept New Bern in the well-founded fear 
that the capital would later migrate even further south. 
Economic motivation was probably less important. Bath lay 
just south of the Albemarle region, so northern interest 
undoubtedly favored economic growth there rather than in 
New Bern. Cape Fear and New Bern were a great distance 
apart, but potential economic growth at a New Bern capital 
probably aided the alliance between Cape Fear interests arid 
the Neuse River region. Johnston, of course, also may have 
been thinking ahead economically to a move from New Bern to 
Cape Fear.
These motivations, though valid, may not explain fully 
the unbending positions taken at that June 174 6 assembly. 
Perhaps a more satisfying explanation would be that the 
capital issue, in itself, was not of paramount importance 
in the stand-off. Rather, the issue was a show of strength 
by both factions. Neither faction capitualted in their 
choice for a capital because other issues were involved in 
the power struggle; one capitulation would lead to others 
by strengthening the opposing faction. A second 
examination of Matthew Rowan's threat to the assembly, 
recorded in the testimony of John Wynns, betyrays the 
character of a "power play". Rowan allegedly said "that 
unless the Burgesses would consent to fix the seat of 
Government at Newbern they might depend there would be no
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Business done, for tho' the Majority of the Burgesses lived 
at the North, the Council were at the South, and could put a 
Negative".18 Was the clash really over the choice of a 
capital, or was it mainly an attempt by each faction to show 
once and for all who would rule North Carolina? The larger 
issues and hostilities found expression, to some degree, in 
the argument over the seat of government.
The events following the November assembly in Wilmington 
support this interpretation. As the assembly gathered, The 
Albemarle representatives remained at home. After two 
prorogations Governor Johnston began the assembly, which 
met with only fifteen of fifty-four members present. The 
first act passed equalized assembly representation and the 
second "fixed a Place for the Seat of Government" at New 
Bern. The assembly also passed quitrent and paper currency 
acts which favored southern interests. Johnston prorogued 
the assembly back to New Bern and then ordered new 
elections. When the Albemarle counties still elected five 
representatives each, Johnston declared their elections 
null and void. Albemarle representatives did not attend 
the assembly for eight more years.19
Both the northern reaction to the Wilmington assembly 
and the governor's subsequent actions showed the minimal 
importance of the seat of government to the sectional 
stands. Albemarle politicians appealed the actions to the 
King. Their "humble Petition" denounced the prorogation to
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Wilmington as deceitful and devious, attributing their own
absence to the difficulty of travelling such a great
distance. They also protested the assembly's meeting
despite lack of a quorum and claimed the representation act
to be a violation of "Ancient Rights and Priveleges". No
complaint was made, however, regarding the establishment of
New Bern as the new seat of government, thus indicating the
issue's minimal importance. Some agitation against the new
capital may have existed, however, for in 1748 Johnston
complained:
One mighty inconvenience we have to
struggle with at present is, That nobody
cares to lay in Provisions for Man or Horse
at Newbern, tho' it is the most central and
fruitful part of the Province; Such pains
are taken to assure the People that the
Seat of Government will be removed, when
• • 20 they get their five members restored . . .
Johnston's complaint could easily have been an
exaggeration or an excuse for New Bern's lack of growth.
Alonzo Dill accepted Johnston's explanation and blamed a
depression in New Bern on the actions of the Albemarle
faction. However, Dill states that the Wilmington
assembly's 174 6 creation of a capital at New Bern
instigated a boom in new taverns and ordinaries which
lasted until 1749. On what, then, did Johnston base his
complaint? Further, to blame New Bern's lack of growth on
threats of removal by the Albemarle faction makes no sense
when one realizes that earlier in 1748 Johnston himself
began a movement to remove the capital from New Bern.21 Yet,
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even if accepted in full, these childish threats against 
New Bern did not give an acceptable indication of the 
capital's importance to the northern faction. The issue of 
the seat of government paled in comparison to that of 
assembly representation.
Bishop Spangenberg also indicated the relative
unimportance of the capital issue in the conflict which
raged during his trip through North Carolina. Although
Spangenberg was well aware of the inconvenience many
underwent travelling to the capital— he suggested the
creation of two seats of government— in his account of the
conflict he made no mention of the capital site as an issue:
There is discord between the Counties, 
which has greatly weakened the authority 
of the Legislature, and interferes with 
the administration of justice. The reason 
is this,— and I hear it from both sides:
When the Colony was still weak the older 
Counties were permitted to send five men 
each to the Assembly. After a long time 
the Colony increased in size, and new 
Counties were formed, but were allowed 
only two representatives each. That 
continued until the newer Counties were 
numerous enough to have the majority in the 
Assembly: then before the older Counties
realized what was being done, an Act was 
passed reducing the representation of the 
older Counties to two each also. This 
irratated the older Counties, and they 
refused to send anyone at all to the 
Assembly, but dispatched an agent to 
England to try to regain for them their 
ancient rights. . . .22
Spangenberg was mistaken in his belief that the Albemarle
faction had lost their majority through natural growth, but
he did perceive a definite reason for the older counties'
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stand— representation.
The actions of the governor and council after the
establishment of New Bern as the seat of government also
indicated that the southern faction had stood for its
selection for more reasons than just a genuine desire to
have it as a capital. The legislative journal of 1748
presented a further discussion on the seat of government:
His Excellency the Governour was pleased 
to recommend it to the Council whether 
instead of New-Bern the present Seate of 
Government, it would not be more Eligible 
to make and Establish the same upon Trent 
river [, ] the publick Buildings not being 
yet erected at New Bern pursuant to Act of 
Assembly in regard to the known 
unhealthiness of the former place from the 
badness of the water and other Causes, And 
the want of proper Accomodations in the 
said Town.
The Council having considered of his 
Excellency's Motion were of Opinion that 
there was sufficient Reason for removing 
the Seat of Government, and that Trent 
river would be a proper place whereon to 
fix the same? and that when a particular 
place has been pitched on a Bill should be 
brought in for that purpose.23
The council had met in New Bern eight times— at the least—
before the assembly of 1746? certainly the governor and
council had prior knowledge of New Bern's unhealthiness and
lack of accommodations before pressing for its acceptance
as the seat of government. Lack of accomodations was in
itself a poor reason to disestablish New Bern as capital,
for none existed at the Trent River site while New Bern was
in the midst of a boom in new ordinaries. They probably had
desired New Bern over Bath because the former was nearer
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Cape Fear, but dissatisfaction with New Bern indicated that 
they mainly wanted to thwart the stubborn Albemarle 
faction.
In 1746, before the discussions on removal of the
capital from New Bern, Johnston answered the northerners'
appeal by presenting his own case to the London
authorities. The governor accused the northern faction of
maliciously subverting the progress of government by
withdrawing from assembly meetings to prevent the passage
of bills unfavorable to them. A major point in his defense
was that the northern representatives boycotted the
Wilmington assembly:
When I prorogued the Assembly in June last 
till the middle of November next then, to 
meet at Wilmington, they entered into a 
formal Agreement not to attend, and to 
engage as many of the other Members as they 
could influence to stay at Home. . . .
[A]fter two small Prorogations to render 
their absence inexcusable, we proceeded to 
Business and passed this Law now under your 
Lorships consideration and another for 
fixing the seat of Government. . . .24
During the ensuing investigation, John Wynns denied knowing
of "any Confedaracy of the Northern Burgesses not to meet at
Wilmington". Katherine Rutledge, however, testified that
she "frequently heard divers of the Northern Members of the
Assembly held at Newbern June 1746 speak bothe before and
after the Assembly was Prorogued to Wilmington that they
would not go thither".25
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Despite the investigation in 1749, an official decision 
was delayed until 1754. On March 26 of that year, the 
Committee of Council for Plantation Affairs recommended 
that the representation act and the act fixing New Bern as 
the seat of government be repealed. The repeal of the first 
act was a decisive victory for the Albemarle faction. 
Ekirch, however, attributed the disallowal of the second 
act, which, in addition to a seat of government, also 
established courts, to the developing British policy of 
strengthened royal prerogative. The act was rejected 
"partly on the grounds that only the governor could 
establish courts".26
Whatever the reasons for the act's disallowance, the 
instructions to Arthur Dobbs, appointed governor in 1754 
following Gabriel Johnston's death, clearly illustrated 
the new status of North Carolina's seat of government. On 
June 17 the Board of Trade directed, "that you do likewise 
forthwith consider of a proper place for the seat of 
Government and make Report thereof to Our Commissioners for 
Trade & Plants in order to be laid before us for our further 
directions therein".27 North Carolina's seat of government 
was once again an unsettled question. The instructions to 
Dobbs, like those to John Harvey in 1679, expressed the 
desire of a ruling body for a capital in North Carolina.
The new governor would struggle with the same 
considerations set forth by the Lords Proprietors. Between
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the two sets of instructions, North Carolina experienced 
the establishment and dislocation of two different seats of 
government, and endured an itinerant government shifting 
among several towns.
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CHAPTER III
THE CURSE OF "PESTIFEROUS ANIMALCULAE"
THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT DURING DOBBS'S ADMINISTRATION
1754-1764
"Many and various have been the Disputes in this
Province, with Regard to fixing upon a proper PLACE for the
Seat of Government." So began James Davis' 1764 account of
the capital dispute in his North Carolina Magazine. In his
article, entitled "Newbern's Remembrancer: Or, An Essay on
the Seat of Government", Davis gave a brief history of the
capital issue during Johnston's administration. Noting
that "this Matter was the great Bone of Contention", and
describing the sectional nature of the dispute as well as
the northern advantage in the assembly, Davis presented the
capital stand in a New Bernian perspective:
At Length, by the great Industry and 
unwearied Diligence of Governor Johnston, 
an Equilibrium was effected, and a Law 
passed for settling the Seat of Government 
at Newbern? but as this Law abridged the 
Northern Counties of some Privileges, 
application was made to England for a 
Repeal of That, and some other Laws. After 
several Years Sollicitation, this Matter 
was determined in their Favour, and a 
Repeal of those Laws sent over by his 
Excellency Arthur Dobbs, Esq? who was then 
appointed Governor of this Province on the 
Death of Mr. Johnston.1
That the debate over the seat of government was really 
the "great Bone of Contention" for the northern and
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southern factions is doubtful, for this and other 
controversies developed from the question of balance of 
power in the assembly. To James Davis, a New Bern resident 
and politician, the capital issue had greater importance 
than it did to the Cape Fear or Albemarle factions, for New 
Bern had been strongly in the running for the seat of 
government. A New Bern resident supporting Johnston's 
stand for the town would also see the governor's efforts as 
effecting an "Equilibrium", when in fact Johnston had 
prorogued an assembly meeting to a place inconvenient to 
his opponents and then defied quorum restrictions to get 
his bills passed. Despite Davis' emphasis on the capital 
issue's importance, he nevertheless admitted that 
opposition to the Wilmington laws developed from the 
abridgement of northern privileges in the assembly.
The date of Davis' article was, however, 1764— a decade 
after Johnston's New Bern law had been repealed. Davis was 
writing long after Johnston's administration ended. The 
capital issue remained unsettled throughout Arthur Dobbs's 
administration and continued to reflect dissensions within 
North Carolina's political sphere. The continued debate, 
as in Johnston's administration, involved aspects inherent 
to the placement of a seat of government: convenience,
healthy situation, economic advantage. The Lords 
Proprietors had considered these factors in their 1679 
instructions to John Harvey concerning an appropriate site.
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These aspects, however, ranked low in priority during 
Dobbs' s administration when men used the controversy as a 
mere tool to accomplish other objectives.
With Arthur Dobbs's instructions of 17 54, the Board of 
Trade instituted a new era in the search for North 
Carolina's permanent seat of government. Instructed to 
"forthwith consider of a proper place for the seat of 
Government and make report thereof", Dobbs nevertheless had 
other urgent matters to consider as he took office.2 The 
new governor's first priority was to bring order out of the 
regional conflict. North Carolina needed a stable 
political situation both to attract new settlers and to put 
forth a united defensive effort with the outbreak of the 
Seven Year's War in 1754. Arthur Dobbs, however, was not a 
disinterested newcomer. As early as 173 5 he owned large 
land grants in New Hanover Precinct (see Map 1) and in the 
growing piedmont area and had recently been an active 
supporter of the Albemarle faction. Despite these earlier 
entanglements in the province, Ekirch claimed that Dobbs 
successfully "eschewed partisanship during the early years 
of his administration", enabling "an uncommon period of 
political peace during the mid-1750's".3
Dobbs's initial assembly, at New Bern on December 12, 
1754, was a momentous occasion in that the Albemarle 
representatives participated for the first time in eight 
years. The new governor called for a united effort for the
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good of the province and diplomatically postponed the 
election for Speaker until all the representatives arrived, 
resulting in the choice of an Albemarle representative. 
James Davis commented on the period of peaceful politics 
following this assembly. "A General Coalition seemed to 
take Place", he observed, "a Sacrifice seemed to have been 
made of all private Animosities and Party-Content ion, and 
the Streams of Government now seemed to flow in a smooth and 
unruff led Channel. " This idyllic phase, however, lasted 
only a few short years. Davis noted, "the great Mutability 
of all Human Affairs soon clouded this Serenity."4
Ekirch attributed the short-lived tranquility to a 
variety of causes. The 1754 Privy Council edicts ended the 
argument over representation in Albemarle's favor. Growing 
Anglo-French hostility and then the outbreak of war 
threatened the province sufficiently to make unified action 
desirable, a need reinforced by a threat of slave 
insurrection in 1752-53. The sudden willingness of 
Virginia merchants to accept paper money from North 
Carolina eased some regional tensions. The aging of 
factional leaders and the desire by both factions to gain 
the new governor's favor also worked to modify 
beligerance.5 Despite the resulting calm, however, the 
capital issue was still much alive in the mind of Governor 
Dobbs.
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Unlike the previous two governors, Dobbs fixed his
residence in New Bern. This made perfect sense to Davis,
"the Seat of Government having been before settled at
NEWBERN, and That being the Centre of the Province".6
Governor Dobbs, however, never had any intention of fixing
the capital at New Bern. In a letter to the Board of Trade,
dated November 9, 1754, Dobbs revealed his plans:
As soon as the seat of Government is fixed 
which I apprehend at present will be upon 
News [Neuse] river, above this town [New 
Bern] , as far as it may be navigable for 
flat bottomed boats, in case I find the 
Lands good, and situation healthy, as it 
will be nearer the back settlements which 
increase very fast, and is most Central, 
and this town will still be the place where 
the merchants will reside and ships be 
entered, and both the gentlemen to 
northward and southward, seem to like it as 
the great Ferries at Edenton and Bath will 
be avoided? and it will be equally near 
Cape Fear, as this place, and more 
healthy. . . .7
Dobbs clearly desired a more central location for the 
capital than New Bern offered. He perceived that a westward 
move would be more convenient to both Albemarle and Cape 
Fear residents and would perhaps cement a relationship 
between the coastal community and the province's rapidly 
growing backcountry. Although Gabriel Johnston had 
attempted to move the seat of government further west of New 
Bern, on the Trent River, Dobbs was first to state nearness 
to back settlements as a motive for such a move. 
Interestingly, Dobbs was also the first officially 
appointed governor to own large tracts of land in the
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piedmont, thus having personal interest in a westward 
shift. Thus, a desire to profit economically from a new 
capital location may have influenced Dobbs's efforts. The 
area which he suggested did lie nearer his tracts than did 
New Bern. In fairness, however, Dobbs expressed the desire 
to remove as little business from New Bern as possible.
Dobbs also believed that the new site would be healthier 
than New Bern. Requesting from the assembly the 
establishment of funds for public buildings, Dobbs stressed 
his "command from his Majesty to look out & fix upon a 
convenient and healthy situation for the seat of Government 
& Courts of Justice", stating that "the Credit & increase of 
the trade of the province depends in a great measure upon 
the healthiness and Increase of the Capital, and having all 
the public Offices together".8
Dobbs later revealed another motive for movement of the 
capital site. In a 1756 letter to the Board of Trade, the 
governor complained that New Bern had "no convenient 
houses. . .but most indifferent houses not 30 feet long and 
2 0 wide exposed to the weather". In his biography of Dobbs, 
Desmond Clarke inferred from such complaints that lack of 
"suitable buildings for business purposes" as well as the 
lack of a "suitable Governor's house played equally 
important in Dobbs's dissatisfaction with either New Bern 
or Wilmington as a capital site.9
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The unhealthiness of New Bern would become the major 
issue of the capital debate during Dobbs' administration. 
Dobbs once described the town as "very aguish" and 
complained "the Water here [New Bern] is very bad[, ] the
land low and sandy with some Marshes near it which adds to
• • mthe Moisture and heat m  the summer and autumn". Not all
considered the situation so serious. James Davis not only
insinuated the contempt with which some of the town's
residents held Dobbs' health concerns, but also the
proportions which the health issue took:
Newbern did not agree with SOME 
Constitutions? the Air and Water were 
judged contagious: the Gentlemen of the
Faculty were consulted? who gave it as 
their Opinion, that the Air and Water of 
Newbern were replete with pestiferous 
Animalculae, and that the only Way to 
preserve Health in those that drank it, was 
to boil it, which would volatize the 
Spirit, and cause the slimy Noxtiae to 
gravitate? or rather to mix with it a 
proper Quantity of good Jamaica, which 
would break the Cohesion, and cause the 
pestiferous Animalculae to subside. In 
short, the PLACE was disagreeable, and a 
NEW ONE must be found.11
Arthur Dobbs set out to find such a new place on April 9, 
1755. Travelling up the Neuse River he viewed favorably the 
site of Tower Hill, forty to fifty miles above New Bern near 
a site called Stringer's Ferry. Dobbs described Tower Hill 
as "fine rising ground from the Ferry, dry, healthy and good 
springs? and extends a considerable way pretty level back 
from the river, where the lands are very good, altho' they 
are piney at some distance from the river." Upon his
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return, Dobbs himself purchased the land at Tower Hill with 
the hope of establishing a new capital there— George City, 
in honor of King George II.12
In May Dobbs sent a letter to the Board of Trade
"relating to the place fixed upon him for the seat of
Government". Although the Lords of Trade commended Dobbs's
early "zeal and regard" for the province in his decisive
actions on the capital issue, they were perhaps worried by
his aggressive and independent attitude and reminded him
who controlled the province's purse:
We have no doubt from the Account and 
description you give us of Stringer's 
Ferry upon Neuse River, that it is a proper 
place for the Seat of Government but we are 
inclined to believe that His Majesty will 
not think it advisable to give any positive 
directions, without having the sense of 
the People taken upon it in the next 
Session of the General Assembly. . . .
Making it even clearer, they continued, "it appears to us
that such directions would be ineffectual, unless there are
Assurances from the People that they will make a proper
Provision for erecting publick Offices and for such other
Services as will necessarily require expense". They
further proposed a joint address from the council and
assembly to the crown.13
An assembly motion, resolved with no dissenting vote on 
October 12, 1756, prepared the way for Dobbs's Tower Hill 
address. The motion declared the town of New Bern an 
"Improper Place for the Seat of Government and the Meeting
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of the General Assembly being found by many years 
Experience from the Badness of the Air and Water thereof to 
be exceedingly unhealthy". With New Bern thus out of 
contention, Dobbs addressed the assembly four days later 
about a new capital site. He informed them that the Board 
of Trade thought it "proper to advise his Majesty that it 
should be somewhere on the River Neuse [, ] but as this 
Province must be at the Expence of erecting several Publick 
Buildings his Majesty will not fix the Place untill the 
Assembly of the Province view the several Situations on the 
River and represent by Address to him which Place they think 
will be most Healthy and convenient". Dobbs desired that 
the assembly view the situations on the river and "choose 
the most convenient place".14
Although the governor instructed the assembly to "view 
the several Situations on the River" which he had nominated 
and then from these sites choose a place for the capital, 
the assembly made no such restrictions in their 
instructions to survey committees. On October 16, the 
assembly resolved to send eleven men "to view the river 
Neuse and that they or a majority of them report their 
Opinion to the next Session of Assembly what part of the 
same is most suitable to fix the Seat of Government and they 
also report their Opinion of any other Place or places". 
Similarly, a committee of five was commissioned on October 
2 3 "to view the several situations of the River Neuse and
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such other places as they think proper for that purpose."15
This discrepancy of thought between governor and 
assembly demonstrates that, though both may have been 
unsatisfied with New Bern as a capital, the assembly was not 
completely charmed by Dobbs's great plans. In fact, the 
assembly took no decisive action on the Tower Hill issue for 
more than two years. "An Act for erecting a City on Neuse 
River, upon the Plantation called Tower-Hill, fixing the 
Seat of Government therein, and building a Governor's 
House, and public Offices in the same", was not proposed 
until November 17 58. The first section of the act 
stipulated the necessity of fixing a capital and voiced the 
traditional concerns for the choice of a site: "Whereas, it
is absolutely necessary, that the Seat of Government shold 
be fixed . . . at a proper healthy Place, as central as may 
be to the Inhabitants of this Government." A second section 
seemed to relate the findings of the survey committees: 
"Tower Hill . . . in Dobbs County, hath been found to be 
healthy and agreeable, having the natural Advantage of a 
pleasant temperate Air, high and dry-Land and wholesome 
Spring." The third section noted the governor's ownership 
of the property and set aside all 850 acres for the sole use 
of the city. The Tower Hill Act was finally signed by the 
governor on December 22.16
The length of time the assembly took to affirm Governor 
Dobbs' plan for a capital belied the possibility that the
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acceptance of Tower Hill was not a straightforward 
development. The assembly's pleasant description of Tower 
Hill also indicated that other motives besides desire for 
an appropriate site were in play, for Dobbs's land may not 
have deserved such praise. James Davis desired the capital 
to remain at New Bern, and his tongue-in-cheek description 
of the new site discredited it as a perfect choice. 
Describing it as a place "about 40 Miles above Newbern, 
pretty pleasantly situated on a high Hill, about a Quarter 
of a Mile from the River, having an impenetrable Morass or 
Swamp in Front, and the River ALMOST navigable for 
Canoes."17 The full impact of the Tower Hill Act's 
suspicious description of the site, however, is found in 
addresses from the assembly and council to the crown 
requesting the repeal of the act. In 1762 these bodies 
complained that the site at Tower Hill "is found extremely 
difficult of access either by Land or Water, to most of the 
Inhabitants of this Province". As a seat of government they 
found it "entirely unfit and Improper for that Purpose[,] 
lying at a great distance from any navigable Water and at 
Certain Seasons of the year Extremely difficult of 
access".18
The complaints of the 1762 assembly and council 
certainly cast doubt on their 1758 counterparts' acceptance 
of Tower Hill on the grounds of appropriateness of site. 
Other motives were involved in the creation of the Tower
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Hill Act, revealed in the events related to the capital 
issue between Dobbs's 1756 address and the 1758 act. The 
two-year lapse indicated a reluctance to accept Dobbs's 
land as a capital site, but several factors transformed 
this reluctance into a firm choice of the site.
Fortunately, the "great deal of caballing and management" 
over the seat of government prompted Governor Dobbs, in a 
letter dated January 22, 1759, to "write fully upon it" to 
the Board of Trade, so at least one side of the story is 
clear.19
The transformation began, strangely enough, with the ill 
health and inadequate accomodations of Governor Dobbs. The 
governor was unhappy with the "small house at a high rent" 
in New Bern which he "was obliged to pay without either 
Garden or field to keep either horse or Cow". The New Bern 
site was also "in a low unhealthy situation" which caused 
Dobbs to have "several relapses in Fever and agues". Dobbs 
informed the Board of Trade that because there were "no 
hopes of fixing on a place for the seat of Government" early 
in 1758, he had inquired for a new residence and was offered 
an incompleted house near Brunswick in the Cape Fear 
region. Clearly the assembly had failed to agree on the 
Tower Hill site, but Dobbs's move to the Cape Fear in the 
spring of 1758 gave him a new strategy to force an 
agreement. This strategy was clear in his own description 
to the Board of Trade:
I last Spring moved my family thither, and
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proposed holding Assemblies alternately at 
Edenton and Wilmington to prevent any 
jealousy between the Northern and Southern 
Inhabitants. This however alarmed the 
Gentlemen in the north lest hereafter the 
seat of Government might be fixed at Cape 
Fear ,v as it has the best navigation in the 
Province, and they made me a proposal to 
fix the seat of Government upon Neuse in 
the situation I recommended to your
• p o  **Lordships. . . .
Once again, North Carolina faced the uneasy situation of 
a governor residing in the Cape Fear region. In 17 3 3 
settlers petitioned Governor Burrington in fear that he 
would remove the capital to the lower part of the Cape Fear 
River. In 1746 Governor Johnston achieved the passage of 
controversial bills by proroguing the assembly to 
Wilmington. In 1758 northern representatives evidently 
felt threatened— quite likely with good reason— that 
Governor Dobbs would establish the capital at Cape Fear, in 
practice if not in law. The assembly latched upon Dobbs's 
Tower Hill site as the lesser of two evils.
Dobbs's strategy, actually a form of blackmail, 
succeeded for the moment. The form which this success took, 
however, demonstrated the tentativeness of the agreement 
between the governor and assembly. The act for fixing the 
seat of government at Tower Hill and erecting public 
buildings should have been passed with a suspending clause- 
-a clause which prevented a bill from taking effect until 
word of the crown's approval had been received. The crown 
frowned upon or repealed bills passed without such a
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clause, but the colonies at times took advantage of their
distance from England by not adding a suspending clause to a
bill which offered no promise of royal approval in order to
benefit from the act until orders to repeal the bill arrived
from the crown. Royal governors were generally instructed
not to pass such bills. The Tower Hill Act passed without a
suspending clause, as Governor Dobbs explained:
[T]his I consented to, and thought upon 
your Lordships having approved of it in 
case they addressed His Majesty upon it to 
lay them under an obligation of paying for 
the buildings, I might venture to pass such 
a Bill without a suspending Clause which 
they thought would delay the building, 
since His Majesty, if He disapproved of it 
would repeal the Bill, and if it were 
delayed, they might change their mind and 
not fix the seat of Government.21
The suspending clause, or lack of it, presents an 
interesting problem in the passage of the Tower Hill Act and 
the psychological games being played by the governor and 
assembly. Governor Dobbs implied that the assembly urged 
him to pass the bill without a suspending clause because 
they did not want to delay the building of public offices 
until word of approval returned to North Carolina. The 
explanation is unacceptable, for the assembly had put off 
any decision on the capital for two years— and would have 
likely continued their indecision had not Dobbs created 
fears of moving the capital to Wilmington. Also, since the 
assembly was sufficiently underwhelmed with the choice of 
Tower Hill, it is unlikely that they would have been anxious
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to begin building offices there at public expense. Dobbs 
may have been completely truthful, however, in asserting 
that the assembly urged him to forget the clause on the 
grounds of speedy building, for the representatives may 
have used buildings as an excuse to get the bill passed 
without a suspending clause, knowing that such a bill would 
probably be vetoed by the crown. On the other hand,
Governor Dobbs may well have been gambling— against the 
odds— that the bill would pass even without the clause, 
hoping that the Lords of Trade would not miss the golden 
opportunity to bind the colonists into paying for the 
public buildings. Dobbs evidently knew that the assembly 
was so lukewarm on the agreement that, if passed with a 
suspending clause, "they might change their mind and not 
fix the seat of government” before the crown’s approval 
reached the province.22
The assembly, however, was far from innocent in 
accepting Tower Hill in the face of Wilmington overtures.
The representatives actually used the Tower Hill Act in 
some blackmail strategy of their own. Governor Dobbs and 
the assembly had been at odds over issues involving the 
power of provincial treasurers. Dobbs desired greater 
control over these men— especially in determining their 
tenures and auditing their accounts.23 In 1758 a related 
controversy arose when Parliament allotted 200,000 to the 
colonies as a reimbursement for military expenses during
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the Seven Years 1s War. North Carolina's lower house 
created a grant bill which would give the province's share 
to the two public treasurers for disbursement. Knowing 
that such a plan would not win the approval of a governor 
already fighting to limit the treasurer's powers, the 
assembly, in December, hoped to use the unwilling Tower 
Hill agreement to force through their grant bill— by 
putting the bills together as a package deal.24
In his letter to the Board of Trade, Governor Dobbs 
explained the development of this grant bill and the 
factional nature the treasurer issue had taken.25 
Governor Dobbs saw this bill as threatening to royal 
prerogative. He noted that the assembly attempted to 
enhance the bill by assuring Dobbs of reimbursement for 
attendance at a Philadelphia military conference and "the 
rent of my house for the time past which were at my private 
expense, thinking I would break through my instructions and 
pass a Bill which so greatly affected His Majesty's 
Perogative and the Power of the Governor and Council".26
Dobbs objected specifically to the lodging of the 
granted sum in specie with the treasurers and the proposed 
appointment, without his approval, of an agent to obtain 
the grant. This agent would receive instructions solely 
from the assembly through its committee of correspondence. 
The assembly, however, "insisted upon it that the first 
Bill for the seat of Government should not pass unless the
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other went with it, as hand and glove”27 Thus the assembly 
returned blackmail for blackmail, refusing to pass the 
Tower Hill Act unless the governor agreed to their grant 
package. This was a gamble on the assembly's part, for 
representatives had already voiced fears that Dobbs would 
begin meeting the assembly at Wilmington— the governor 
could do this without officially fixing a seat of 
government. These representatives must have been aware of 
a keen personal desire on Dobbs's part to have the capital 
at Tower Hill— a desire so great it would tempt him to 
approve such a distasteful grant proposal. Less likely, 
the assembly's fears of a move in the seat of government may 
have been contrived, leading Dobbs to believe his blackmail 
had worked, while in reality setting the governor up for the 
grant scheme. The previous history of the capital issue, 
however, supports the view that the assembly was acting on a 
legitimate fear, but saw the allottment as a means to 
benefit from their Tower Hill compromise. In any case, the 
assembly depended on Dobbs' desire for a capital on his own 
property.
Governor Dobbs may well have been motivated by the 
chance of personal gain— Tower Hill was, after all, his own 
possession. Dobbs's biographer, Desmond Clarke, discounts 
this possibility entirely. When asked by the assembly for a 
proper price for the capital site, the governor had 
replied, "as you have thought it the properest place for the
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seat of Government from its Healthy situation and being
most central for the Ease of the Inhabitants (though I
should have been glad that it had been fixed on any other
convenient Situation) I shall desire no more than the
original sum which it cost me”.28 Clarke viewed Dobbs's
reply as proof against the charges "that he purchased the
Tower Hill property with the avowed intention of utilising
it as a site for the seat of Government and reaping a rich
return on the sale of land". That Dobbs did indeed purchase
the site with "the avowed intention" of a capital is clear
from the records. True, Dobbs made no profit from the sale
of the capital site, but Clarke further asserted that Dobbs
"never pressed the Assembly to purchase his property, nor
did he show the slightest desire to enrich himself at the
expense of the province".29 Both these claims are doubtful
in the face of the pressure Dobbs asserted on the removal of
the capital to Cape Fear, the assembly's hesitance at
accepting Tower Hill, and the fact that Dobbs purchased
other porperty near the proposed capital site. Earlier in
Dobbs's biography, Clarke quoted a private letter of 1755,
in which the governor confided to a friend to have
purchased a plantation of 900 acres about 
ten miles from here [New Bern] on a fine 
navigable river . . . and will be at a 
reasonable distance of the seat of 
Government. Whether I fix it here or 
higher up the Neuse river I shall be within 
an easy day's journey of it. I have taken 
out a war rent to have a patent for 1,000 
acres more in my daughter Fanny's 
name . . . which . . .  I design to give her 
as an addition to her portion which will be
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very valuable once the capital is paid.30 
Dobbs did not give the location of his daughter's property, 
and used "capital" in its economic rather than geographical 
meaning, but the governor did own at least 900 acres between 
New Bern and Tower Hill. The possibility of self interest 
in Dobbs' desire for a capital west on the Neuse is made 
plausible by these lands and the governor's possessions in 
the back country. The assembly may well have been appealing 
to financial motives in using the Tower Hill Act to tempt 
the governor.
The ball did not lie in the assembly's court for long. 
Dobbs confessed to the Board of Trade that "upon this fine 
spun scheme I thought to finesse as well as they".
According to North Carolina legislative procedure, a bill 
had to be passed by both the lower house and the upper house 
three times— not becoming law until the third passage by 
the upper house (council) and the governor's signature. In 
his "finesse", Dobbs spoke to his friends in the council, 
asking them "not to oppose the 2d Bill until the third 
reading except in some trifling amendments". When the 
lower house had passed both bills for the third time, Dobbs 
assembled the council and informed them that the second 
bill was "of an extraordinary nature which affected His 
Majesty's Prerogative and the rights of the Governor and 
Council", showing them articles of his instructions which 
conflicted with the bill. Although some council members
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suggested a suspending clause would validity the bill, 
Dobbs successfully persuaded them not to pass it. The 
council passed the first bill for the third time, 
establishing the seat of government at Tower Hill, but 
postponed reading the second bill, thus enabling 
prorogation before even considering the bill.31
The governor's success naturally provoked the lower
house. Dobbs described the hostility:
[U]pon this Disappointment the Lower House 
were all in a flame, the managers being 
greatly disappointed; & represented to me 
that there must be a Dissolution unless the 
upper House would resume the Bill, 
desiring I would speak to the Council to 
revoke their resolution, and pass the 
Bill— I told them I thought it was 
unprecedented, but they were to have no 
restraint put upon them.32
When the assembly met again in May 1759, the lower house
renewed its attempts to gain control of Parliament's grant,
sending James Abercromby to England as its own agent. The
grant issue, however, was then divorced from the capital
site, the former resolved in 1763 to the favor of the lower
house.33
The Tower Hill Act which failed to achieve the 
assembly's purpose in 1759, faced a bleak future, for the 
lower house never wholeheartedly approved of the site. The 
exact route of the act's death, however, is uncertain. 
James Davis was vague in describing the fate of the capital 
site:
But as there was another Bill to have 
passed at this Time, and have gone Hand in
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Hand with it . . . the Loss and Miscarriage 
of that Bill so benumbed and froze up the 
Spirit of the other, that poor Tower-Hill 
was neglected, and the great Ardor of the 
commissioners for building the City of 
G E O R G E ,  quite dissipated.34
That there was much "Spirit" to "freeze up" was debatable,
but the plans for George City certainly did fall by the
wayside. Samuel A 1 Court Ashe asserted that in April 17 59
the Board of Trade instructed Dobbs to repeal the act fixing
the seat of government at Tower Hill, for the lack of a
suspending clause. This instruction was accompanied by the
disallowance of six other statutes, including a judiciary
act establishing superior courts. Governor Dobbs delayed
enforcement of the judiciary repeal for practical reasons,
and may have also done little to execute the Tower Hill
repeal.35 In any case, the act was still alive and kicking
in 1762, for the assembly then began fighting it bitterly.
Hugh T. Lefler asserted that the law was promptly 
disallowed when "the Privy Council learned that this site 
was located on lands owned by Dobbs personally and that 
there had been charges of speculation and corruption in 
getting the statute passed".36 Lefler did not clarify, 
however, if these reasons applied to the 17 59 repeal or to 
the ultimate repeal after 1762. That the royal colonial 
administration had been unaware for seven years that the 
potential site originally belonged to Arthur Dobbs is 
highly unlikely. As late as June 1762, however, the Lords 
of Trade showed both willingness to support a capital at
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Tower Hill and suspiciousness of the act. The Board, having
received confused correspondence "concerning that part of
the money appropriated for building a City upon Neuse
River", were "totally at a loss to guess" Dobbs's
connection between the act and the past Parliamentary
grant— already allocated:
[H]ad this Act been passed, as it certainly 
ought to have been, with a Clause 
suspending its execution until the King's 
Pleasure had been known your meaning would 
have been obvious [, ] but as there is no 
such Clause and as the Share of your 
Province . . . has, we suppose been long 
since received by the Agent, we know of 
nothing that can prevent the Act from being 
carried into execution unless his Majesty 
should repeal it which we shall not take 
upon us to advise, so long as the Reasons 
that induced the passing it and which 
appeared from your Letters to the late 
Board to be so well founded in reason and 
good Policy stand unimpeached.37
Petitions from both houses of the assembly to the crown for
repeal of the Tower Hill Act, made in April and December of
that year, enabled the Board to infer that Dobbs's reasons
were not "so well founded" after all.
The Tower Hill controversy, as had the capital issue 
during Johnston's administration, began in the context of 
much larger conflicts between the governor and the 
assembly. James Davis gave a picturesque account of the 
growing tensions of the late 1750's and early 60's. 
"DISCONTENT sat on every Brow, and warm Messages and 
Answers passed between the Governor and the Lower House of
Assembly. It would be tedious and disagreeable to wade
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thro' all the Hot Water of these Times . . . .1,38 The "Hot 
Water" by 17 60 mainly consisted of the Parliamentary 
allottment, a superior court bill, and a military aid 
request: all engendered strong disagreement. The lower
house received a leader in Thomas Child, agent of John 
Carteret, Earl of Granville, who was proprietor of the 
northern half of the province. Child, having been absent 
from North Carolina for nine years, returned in 1759 and 
regained his post as attorney general. Dobbs appointed him 
to the council in 1760, but Child, having pretensions to the 
governorship, allied with the lower house, convincing the 
representatives that his influence with Granville could 
achieve Dobbs's dismissal. On May 23, 1760, the lower house 
met in a closed, secret session and adopted an address to 
the king composed of fifteen complaints against Governor 
Dobbs, requesting his dismissal. One of the resolves 
complained of Dobbs's removal of public papers to Cape 
Fear. Dobbs learned of the address, but was busy in 
battling the assembly over other vital issues. The house 
rejected the governor's compromise on the courts bill, but 
when he prorogued the assembly for three days, the 
representatives finally consented to it on May 26. Dobbs, 
however, rejected the assembly's military aid bill and 
prorogued the assembly until September. Then, following 
the lead of his predecessor, Dobbs changed his mind and 
called a June assembly meeting in Wilmington, probably
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hoping Child and his "Northern Junto" would boycott the 
session.39
Dobbs ' s opponents did indeed forego the long trek to 
Cape Fear, and the governor achieved the passage of his aid 
bill, suceeded in skillfully thwarting the lower house's 
attempts at his dismissal, and witnessed the dissolution of 
his opposition. Ekirch asserted that the remaining four 
years of Dobbs's administration "witnessed a return to 
relative political tranquility". Although disputes 
continued, most ended in compromise or in a direct ruling 
from the Board of Trade.40 The capital issue, however, was 
never settled during Dobbs's administration. In fact, from 
1760 to 1764 animosity over the location of the seat of 
government increased.
In remembering 1760, James Davis described an impending
doom in stark contrast to Ekirch's peaceful scene: "And now
the Cloud that before was only seen at a Distance, began to
gather thick, and the Storm threatened to break over our
Heads!" The worst of the storm, as Davis perceived, was
Dobbs's removal of government functions to Cape Fear:
[T]he Seat of Government was totalled 
removed to Wilmington; Assemblies, Courts 
of Chancery and Claims, were there held; 
the Secretary's Office was translated to 
that See, and a C A R T dispatched to 
Newbern for PUBLIC RECORDS. Now it was, 
that those who were dissatisfied with the 
Seat of Government at Newbern, and wanted 
it nearer Home, saw it, too late, removed 
farther off; saw it removed 100 Miles 
farther, to the Southern Extremity of the 
Province; saw it removed to a sandy Desart, 
to which they could not approach, but at
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the Expense of their Horses Hoofs!41 
Davis' subjective lament of Wilmington did relate the true 
fact that by 17 61 complaints concerning assembly meetings 
in Wilmington arose not only among New Bern and northern 
representatives, but also among house members from the 
back-country.42
These complaints sparked little sympathy on Dobbs's 
part, but they did move him to give a bit of advice. James 
Davis described that "[i]n this Situation of Affairs, great 
Complaints were made; and his Excellency the Governor was 
pleased to tell the People, the Fault lay at their own 
Doors, why did not they Address his Majesty to settle the 
Seat of Government, as he could not pass a Bill for that 
Purpose?"43 In response the houses sent a joint address to 
the king in April 1762, asking for the repeal of the Tower 
Hill Act— because of that site's poor qualities—  
requesting the seat of government be established at New 
Bern, and promising to erect there a governor's residence 
and other necessary public buildings.44
The April address, however, met with no success and the 
assembly instigated another petition on December 1, 1762.
On that same date Dobbs petitioned the assembly to be paid 
the principal and four years interest of the Tower Hill 
purchase price, asserting that he "never Interferred with 
The Land nor received any Benefit from it".45 No answer to 
Dobbs was recorded, but the assembly spent much time
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preparing their address to the king. A joint committee from 
the assembly and council examined the problem. The 
resulting petition spelled out the unfit situation of Tower 
Hill, "lying at a great distance from any navigable Water 
and at Certain Seasons of the year Extremely difficult of 
access, to most of the Inhabitants of this Province". The 
petitioners also recommended "the Town of New Bern in 
Craven County as being in our Humble opinion more Central 
and Convenient than any other part of this Province for 
transacting the Business of the Public".46
Still, not all involved were agreed on the choice of New 
Bern as the capital. The Council representatives to the 
joint committee protested that "however fond we may be of 
getting the Act for fixing a seat of Government at Tower 
Hill repealed, We cannot agree that at this time it is 
necessary to address His Majesty to fix the seat of 
Government at any certain place more especially at the Town 
of New Bern". They gave four reasons why such a request 
should not be made at that time: North Carolina's
southwestern border was still unsettled, New Bern could 
claim neither the best navigation nor the most central 
location, the town was notoriously unhealthy, and the great 
distance from the "back Settlement" to New Bern would 
inconvenience "the poor Inhabitants of those parts". It 
was because of these problems, they believed, "that the 
address was carried in the Assembly but by a small Majority,
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and in the Council but by the Casting Votes of the President 
only, Whereas in a matter of such consequence there ought to 
have been if not a unanimous consent at least a large 
Majority of both Houses11. Thus they advised the crown to 
"pay no regard to this address".47
Whether or not influenced by the council members' 
advice, the crown did just that. The December address, like 
its April counterpart, achieved no success. According to 
Davis, the assembly's agent in London informed the 
petitioners that the request had been "cooly re-delivered 
to him" because it "blended with Matter of a different 
Nature, which was unprecedented, and therefore could not be 
presented to his Majesty". Another petition would have to 
be sent.48
James Davis lamented this delay, asserting that it was 
not for the public good. Davis did not believe the offered 
explanation that the "Matter of a different Nature" 
involved in the petition refusal was simply the assembly's 
failure to congratulate the king in recent military 
victories. "And can it be supposed," he asked, "that the 
BEST of Kings would Refute to Settle perhaps one of the most 
distressed of his Provinces, only because their Address to 
him for that Purpose sat out with congratulating him on the 
Success of the War?" He feared that North Carolina had not 
been given "FAIR PLAY" in the delay, which was "incongruous 
to Justice, and baneful to Liberty". Furthermore, the
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delay allowed a vacancy in the council, caused by the death 
of a supporter of the address, to be filled by a Cape Fear
49man.
Governor Dobbs 1s resistance was perhaps also 
influential in the petition's failure. Asked by the 
assembly to recommend New Bern to the crown, Dobbs wrote to 
the Board of Trade in February 1763, that he "could not 
recommend it as a healthy situation, having been thrice at 
death's door from its low-stagnated situation & bad water, . 
and as to its being most central, that depends upon the 
manner of His Majesty's fixing the Boundary Line upon St 
Augustine & Florida's being added to His Majesty's 
Acquisitions".50 Evidently Dobbs, and his supporters in the 
Council, were unrealistically hoping that a revision of 
North Carolina's southern border would make the Cape Fear 
region more acceptable as a capital site.
Dobbs's poor health brought the capital dispute to a 
governmental crisis during 1763. A serious illness early 
that year temporarily cost Dobbs the use of his legs and he 
considered returning to England. The governor had only 
partially recovered by spring and persisted in holding 
assembly meetings at Wilmington. In December, northern 
members refused to travel to Cape Fear; the members who did 
meet, though constituting a quorum, refused to conduct any 
business in the absence of so many of their peers. Dobbs 
eventually allowed the members to dissolve themselves and
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then called for new elections. In his sympathetic 
portrayal of the governor, Desmond Clarke conceded that 
Dobbs * s action was perhaps "harsh and arbitrary", yet 
states that "it is difficult to see what else he could have 
done under the circumstances".51
Representing the Society for Propogating the Gospel in
North Carolina, James Reed described the political chaos in
a December 2 6 letter:
[Y]esterday I received information that on 
the 2 0th there was not a sufficient number 
of members then arrived to make a house & 
that it was the current opinion there would 
be no session of Assembly this winter,
Wilmington is not at all central, but a 
remote part of the Province, where 'tis 
quite inconvenient for the majority of the 
assembly-men to attend & our Govr is too 
infirm to meet them at any other place. In 
short the Province is in great confusion 
for want of the seat of government being 
fixed & the approaching dissolution of the 
Governor, presents us with a gloomy 
prospect, upon his decease I expect that 
old quarrels will be renewed[, ] old 
grievances repeated & the whole Province 
disunited & divided into the old Parties of 
North & South . . . .52
Dobbs was indeed rekindling the old sectional split, and in
early 1764 succeeded in getting several of his desired
bills passed in the absence of northern representatives.53
The unsettled and threatening political scene of August 
1764 spurred James Davis to write his essay on North 
Carolina*s capital. He concluded his article by begging 
representatives to attend the October assembly in 
Wilmington, "or perhaps while we are pleasing ourselves
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with these Golden Scenes, the Great Fiat may be passed, and
the Door shut against you; the Seat of Government may be
Settled at Wilmington, and then, too late, we may behold the
wretched State of the Province”. Davis was extreme in
stirring up the representatives' discontent:
And now my Countrymen, what would Some of 
you give, to have the Seat of Government 
again at Newbern? To have it in the Centre 
of the Province, where seldom an Assembly 
was held, but every Member that possibly 
could, gave his Attendance; and where 
there never was Occasion to Prorogue and 
Dissolve, to Dissolve and Prorogue again, 
before an Assembly could be got? Methinks 
I hear some of you break out, "O Newbern,
Newbern! When shall I again tread thy 
Grassy Plains, and shake the Wilmingtonian 
Dust from my Feet! When again shall I 
breathe that Air, and drink of that Water, 
which I was once induced to believe were 
'replete with pestiferous Animalculae!
But enough! 'tis done; and I am doomed to 
give my Attendance in a sandy 
Desart. . . . "54
Davis' attack on Wilmington gave evidence of a 
development which helped control the sectional crisis of 
1763-1764. The southern faction in 1746 had been composed 
of both Cape Fear and Neuse interests, but was now split by 
a New Bern/Wilmington rivalry— New Bern interests becoming 
"increasingly resentful over Wilmington's threatened 
dominance as the colony's capital".55 Ekirch emphasized 
that Dobbs's impending departure also helped to restrain 
conflict. In 1764, the crown appointed William Tryon as 
lieutenant governor in anticipation of Dobbs's retirement
in March 1765. Leading provincials quieted their conflicts
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To James Davis, at least, Tryon's appointment as
lieutenant governor gave hope to a settlement of the
capital dispute:
And are THESE TIMES to continue? No, my 
Countrymen! His Majesty our most Gracious 
Sovereign, has said No: A King whose Ear
is naturally tun'd to the charming Voice of 
LIBERTY? a King who has declared from the 
Throne the tender Concern he feels for All 
his People, has said No. Our Grievances 
have SOME HOW OR OTHER reached his Royal 
Ear, and he has been graciously pleased to 
appoint us a New Governor? under whose 
Administration we have the Blessed Hope of 
seeing the Settlement of the Country? of 
seeing, that a Gentleman who may 
reasonably be supposed divested of all 
Manner of Prejudice or Partiality in 
Favour of this or that Party, will settle 
in the Centre of the Country, and call the 
Assemblies to a P L A C E where they will 
meet him with Cheerfulness and Alacrity.57
Davis was undoubtedly confident that "the Centre of the
Country" would prove to be his precious New Bern.
Tryon's administration would indeed, to a New Bernian's 
view, set things aright. After a decade of gubernatorial 
attempts to move the capital away from New Bern, Governor 
Tryon would with little hesitation establish New Bern as 
capital. Davis, however, was perhaps not far-sighted 
enough. With the rise of Tryon, he perceived the rise of 
New Bern? but beyond that he failed to see that approaching 
revolution would again upset the capital site. Still, 
after decades of uncertainty, North Carolina would have a 
colonial capital.
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CHAPTER IV
RESOLUTION AND REVOLUTION 
THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, 17 64-17 87
"We hear from Cape Fear", James Davis announced in his 
North-Carolina Magazine on August 10, 1764, "that a 
Lieutenant Governor of the Province is appointed at Home 
one Col. Tryan, an Officer in the Guards; and that he is 
expected out immediately. 'Tis also said, that his 
Excellency the Governor goes home in March next".1 Governor 
Arthur Dobbs's impending departure and William Tryon's 
appointment as lieutenant governor helped calm the 
political agitation which had been festering in North 
Carolina. A. Roger Ekirch proposes that Dobbs's 
anticipated departure— enhanced by his unexpected death in 
March 1765— caused provincial leaders to cool their 
sectional tempers in hopes of winning the new executive's 
favor.2 James Davis directed his newspaper article, 
however, toward the specific dispute over North Carolina's 
seat of government. Governor Gabriel Johnston had 
successfully dislocated the capital from Edenton after 
1736. Since then varied attempts to establish a capital at 




Davis hoped that the new lieutenant governor would end 
the thirty years of limbo. As an active and outspoken 
resident of New Bern, he also had a definite bias as to 
where Tryon should establish the capital. Davis knew 
though that Wilmington had eyes on the new governor as well, 
and said so with tongue well in cheek: "The good People of
Wilmington, ever intent on the Good of the Province, and 
always foremost in every Scheme for its Welfare and 
internal Quietude, immediately. . . engaged a large House.
. . for the Reception and Accomodation of the Governor on 
his Arrival. . . upon a Certainty that he will settle among 
them there."3 Such Wilmingtonian hopes were probably fired 
by New Bern's failure to keep Governor Dobbs.
Governor Dobbs's removal of public business to
Wilmington had been a blow to the commercial life of James
Davis's town, but New Bern was not guiltless in its
misfortune.4 John Campbell of Bertie County wrote to a New
Bern resident during that sad time:
The account of the dullness of your Town & 
buissness in it I am sorry for[,] but the 
unthinking People in and about it must 
thank themsels who drove away the Govr &
Officers. These People could not bear a 
little flow of money, but Grew So Proud &
Insolent they will feel the reverse and now 
may reflect on themselves when too 
Late. . . .5
The commercial interests of New Bern had not only failed to 
provide adequate housing for the governor but also charged 
unusually high prices for needed goods. Likewise, in 17 64,
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James Davis lamented with "Terrible Horribility!" the high 
prices then being charged in Wilmington, where Dobbs had 
moved many government offices.6
By the time Tryon arrived, however, New Bern had learned
its lesson. Davis proudly stated his town's case:
But the People of Newbern, having for their 
Disobediance, drank largely of the Cup of 
Affliction and entirely depending on the 
Goodness of their Cause, have engaged a 
large genteel House. . . for the Governor's 
Residence; upon a Supposition he will 
settle rather in the Centre of the 
Province, than at Cape-Fear, a Place 
within Fifty Miles of the South Boundary of 
a Province almost 3 00 Miles wide, and the 
Passage to it gloomy and dismal, through 
hot parching Sands, enliven'd now and then 
by Wire Grass Ridges and Ponds of stagnant 
Water.7
The New Bernians made a residence available to the new 
governor for only four pence per year.8
Tryon's choice certainly was not limited to these two 
competing towns. He might well have chosen a more western 
location, nearer the populous back country; in fact, some 
historians insist the the eastern regions united behind the 
choice of New Bern in fear that Tryon would name 
Hillsborough as the capital (see Map 2) .9 Such a fear may 
have existed, and the eventual assembly approval of Tryon's 
Palace in New Bern showed some degree of cooperation 
between eastern assemblymen, but such cooperation should 
not be overstated. The growing competition, economic as 
well as political, between New Bern and Wilmington hindered 































of the Wilmingtonians, though far from objective, reflected
the disagreement between the leaders of the two towns as to
the choice of a capital. As late as 1774, the future
governor Samuel Johnston, in writing to representative
Alexander Elmsly concerning conflict with "the Southern
Gentlemen," asserted "the Cape Fear people can hardly find
in their hearts to forgive you for fixing the Governor's
10House at New Bern".
New Bern's fear that either Wilmington or Hillsborough 
would be chosen as the capital proved groundless. Even 
before Tryon officially became governor, he favored New 
Bern as the future capital. He wrote to Lord Adam Gordon in 
England: "If the Seat of Government Should ever happen to
be established there [New Bern] , as it probably may, from 
its being nearly Central, it will become a place of Note 
very soon, and will outvie any other Town in North 
Carolina".11 After a two-month tour of the province, Tryon 
became confirmed in his conviction that the "Publick 
Business" of North Carolina could "be carried on nowhere 
with so much conveniency and advantage to far the greatest 
part of the Inhabitants, as at New Bern".12 Joseph A. Ernst 
and H. Roy Merrens perceive specific commercial motives for 
Tryon's choice of New Bern, the location of the capital 
having primary significance within the context of a broad 
campaign for North Carolina's economic growth. In their 
study of urban development, Ernst and Merrens describe both
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the location of the capital at New Bern and the erection of 
an expensive governor's palace as directed by a similar 
objective: "to provide not only for the easier
administration of the colony but also for the creation of a 
great port city and marketplace in the central port of the 
province in the continuing drive to offset the economic 
advantages of Charleston.1,13 Such an interpretaion has 
merit, especially considering Tryon's view of New Bern as 
"nearly Central." The governor's conception of New Bern's 
centrality gave evidence of his failure to duly consider 
the growing back settlements— a neglect which led him to 
misjudge the town's centrality, its potential for growth, 
and popular support of his palace. A royal governor such as 
Tryon, however, would naturally have an eastern bias in 
considering geographical centrality: for him, easy access
j
to the Atlantic, and thus to London, would outvie other 
considerations in choosing a capital site.
Whether or not Tryon knew upon his arrival that New Bern 
would be his choice for the seat of government, he certainly 
had plans for an elaborate capitol and governor's mansion. 
John Hawks, a master architect, accompanied Tryon to North 
Carolina, for the new governor "esteemed it very material 
for the credit and interest of this province that the 
governor should have a fixed and commodious place of 
residence for doing publick business."14 The majority of 
the lower house of assembly agreed with Tryon, and in
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December 17 66 passed an act for the construction of a 
governor's mansion in New Bern funded by 5,000 in North 
Carolina currency. In January 17 68 the lower house 
appropriated 10,000 more for the construction of what 
became known as "Tryon's Palace."15 Plans for an official 
governor's residence resolved the quandary over the 
colony's seat of government, for even though the assembly 
made no specific mention of New Bern as capital, the palace 
was to serve the dual purpose of governor's residence and 
assembly house. The assembly assumed the capital issue to 
be settled in 1766, for experience had shown the great 
influence which gubernatorial residence had over the 
location of provincial government.
Another issue, perhaps not totally unrelated to that of 
the capital, which marked Tryon's first year as governor 
was North Carolina's reaction to the Stamp Act. Opposition 
to the tax first became evident in early May 1765. By the 
fall, demonstrations had occurred in Cross Creek, Edenton, 
New Bern, and Wilmington. Although Wilmington's first 
demonstration did not take place until October 19, the 
Lower Cape Fear experienced the most widespread and violent 
of the colony's stamp tax protests.16 Several explanations 
exist for this concentration of protest in the Lower Cape 
Fear region. Brunswick, just downriver from Wilmington, 
served as the province's principal port, so the region 
would naturally feel the greatest effect of the proposed
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tax. Both the stamp master's residence in Brunswick and 
Tryon's temporary residence there both influenced the 
degree of protest in the Wilmington area. Ekirch proposes 
another influence on relative degrees of protest in North 
Carolina. Although he emphasizes that the act was 
unpopular throughout the colony, Ekirch states that 
inhabitants of more northern towns "may have moderated 
their tempers because of Tryon's decision to fix the 
capital in New Bern, much to their delight and the anger of 
Cape Fear residents."17 If correct, this analysis gives 
impetus to the possibility that Tryon's efforts at 
temporary compromise— living in Brunswick while holding 
assemblies at New Bern— did not satisfactorily assuage the 
Wilmingtonians. Cape Fear interests sensed that, in this 
instance, current gubernatorial residence would not alter 
Tryon's choice of New Bern as the capital site.
The actual construction of Tryon's residence in New Bern 
proved unpopular with segments of the populous piedmont 
area. The Regulators, who initially organized in Orange 
County in 1766 and whose influence later spread into 
surrounding areas, protested many aspects of perceived 
governmental corruption, mainly on the local level. The 
Regulators were frustrated at the monopoly of non-native 
lawyers and merchants in local government positions, and 
these new elites' lucrative use of exhorbitant fees, which
10 , ,
often hit the western farmers hard. The costs of building
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John Hawks1 s two-story brick palace with curved colonnades 
and outlying wings greatly exceeded provincial funds and 
was placed directly on the people through a poll tax and a 
tax on alcoholic beverages. The Regulators protested such 
taxation when not "' one man in twenty of the four most 
populous counties [Orange, Rowan, Mecklenburg, and Anson] 
will ever see this famous house when built (as their 
connections and trade do, and ever will more naturally 
center in South Carolina) 111.19 Ekirch asserts that the 
Regulators not only resented to cost of the building, but 
also saw it symbolic of the corruption which they
increasingly viewed as widespread and "as evidence of
• • • • • 20 •courtly intrigue involving Tryon himself." It is
important to remember, in the context of North Carolinafs 
long struggle over the capital's location, that the 
Regulators did not protest the choice of New Bern as the 
seat of government. There may have been some resentment 
over such an eastern capital, but it was not voiced. After 
all, in the Regulators' eyes, New Bern was a better site 
than Wilmington, and Hillsborough simply had not been in 
the running for capital to the degree it would be by the 
1780's. Rather, the Regulators protested paying for what 
they considered an unnecessarily expensive building 
located far from their homes.
Despite western protest, the palace was completed in 
177 0 and Governor Tryon moved from Brunswick to New Bern in
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early June.21 Almost a year later, militiamen led by Tryon 
defeated the Regulators at the Battle of Alamance.
Military defeat did not greatly reduce backcountry
resentment against the governor's palace; neither did the
\
location of the capital— so long hotly disputed— suddenly 
become a benign issue. In September 1771 a subscriber to 
the Virginia Gazette, calling himself "Phocion", felt it 
necessary to defend both the legitimacy of the capital and 
Tryon's impartiality:
The Design of building a Palace for 
the Governor was schemed by some Gentleman 
of the Assembly, who proposed by this 
Means, to fix the Seat of Government in a 
Town convenient for the whole Province; as 
many Members were often greatly 
incommoded, by the Necessity [of going] 
from one extreme Part of the Province to 
another. This I am authoritatively 
assured, was the original Cause of the 
Erection of the Palace; and I assert it was 
formed by Gentlemen who were not 
officially dependent on the Governour, and 
were not, many of them, personal Friends to 
him. . . .22
Phocion may not have realized that Tryon arrived in North 
Carolina with architect in hand. In writing about the 
palace to the Earl of Shelburne, Tryon confided that John 
Hawks "came with me out of England to superintend this work 
in all its branches".23 Phocion, however, was correct in 
implying that the governor could not have succeeded in his 
plans for an official seat of government or governor's 
residence without the assembly's cooperation. Regardless 
of the governor's motives, resentment of the capital would
8 6 ,
die hard for some, as evidenced again by Samuel Johnston's 
words of 1774, "the Cape Fear people can hardly find in 
their hearts to forgive you for gixing the Governor's House 
at New Bern" .24
As of 1765, North Carolina finally had a permanent seat 
of government— the first official one since Edenton of the 
17 3 0's— and even had a permanent building for the 
legislature as of 1770. With the outbreak of the Revolution 
and the growing population of the western areas, however, 
the new state legislatures would succeed in stripping New 
Bern of its status as a capital in much the same way Gabriel 
Johnston maneuvered the government away from Edenton. 
Important differences did exist between the two 
dislocations— differences partly caused by the meaning of 
the Revolution and partly by new sectional tensions.
In 1771, a victorious Governor Tryon was grateful to be 
replaced by Josiah Martin. Martin, a strong supporter of 
royal prerogative, would soon face the crisis of a greater 
rebellion than his predecessor had encountered. At first 
the Revolution portended no threat to New Bern's status as 
capital. When in 1774 Martin refused to summon the 
legislature in time to elect delegates to the First 
Continental Congress, the resulting Provincial Congress 
met at New Bern, to choose delegates and establish a non­
importation policy in reaction to the Tea Act of 1773. In 
April 1775 the assembly and the Second Provincial Congress-
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-almost identical in memberships— both met in New Bern a 
day apart. Governor Martin dissolved this last fruitless 
assembly on 8 April. By 31 May he had taken refuge on a 
British man-of-war upon the threat of an attack by the 
Wilmington and New Hanover committees of safety.25 Royal 
government in North Carolina had collapsed.
The first hint of New Bern's fate came in August 1775, 
when the third Provincial Congress met at Hillsborough.
The Hillsborough Provincial Congress— the first body 
claiming authority for North Carolina to meet outside of 
New Bern since 1765— set up a provisional government and 
made plans for war. The following three state legislatures 
did meet in New Bern, but in August 1778 the legislature met 
in Hillsborough, unknowingly inaugurating a new period of 
itinerant government that would last until 1794, when the 
assembly would meet in the new capital of Raleigh. During 
the interim, the government would visit not only 
Hillsborough and New Bern, but also Halifax, Smithfield, 
Wake County, and Tarboro. The itineracy of Governor 
Gabriel Johnston's day had developed due to the growing 
population of the Cape Fear region— a region in which 
Johnston, the man who called the assembly meetings, claimed 
residency. In the 1770's, the growing population of the 
western counties, which were continually playing "catch­
up" in assembly representation, gradually came to have a 
greater voice in legislature. After 1775, the legislature
itself could determine where it would meet, so demand for 
sites more central than New Bern grew until the old capital 
city yielded to Hillsboro, Halifax, and Smithfield.
Without a royal governor to name the place to meet, however, 
itinerant government under Governor Richard Caswell and his 
successors took on a new dimnension of instability as the 
assemblymen debated locations. The debates caused 
problems, for example, the standoff between Fayetteville 
and New Bern in 1790.26 Debates on meeting places also 
resulted in the lack of a quorum when western legislators 
won meetings as far west as Salem.27
Influences other than westerly growth also affected New 
Bern's status as the seat of government and the state's new 
era of governmental itineracy. A 1779 smallpox epidemic 
prevented the scheduled spring general assembly session 
from meeting in New Bern. Governor Richard Caswell, 
powerless to call the assembly "to any other place than that 
to which the same stood adjourned," requested that the body 
meet at Johnston Court House (later Smithfield) . The 
governor's correspondence that year stressed a military 
threat to New Bern and eastern North Carolina which helped 
diminish the town's usefulness as a governmental center.
In explaining why North Carolina militia would probably not 
be sent south, Caswell described the situtation in May:
I think you need not look for any more Militia 
from this State, as the enemy, about 3,000, have 
actually invaded Virginia, taken possession of the 
Fort at Portsmouth, burnt Suffolk, and threaten 
Edenton, New Bern and Wilmington, with every other
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part of the State to which they can get access, with 
destruction and desolation, which seems in some 
measure probable, as they have three or four Row 
Galleys, calculated to go up our Sounds by their 
small draft of water.29
In considering this threat, Caswell commanded the public
provisions at New Bern, "insecure from the ravages of the
enemy," to be moved inland.30 If public provisions needed to
be moved upriver, state government would likely be safer
there, too. Smallpox and the military threat worked
together to make New Bern an unattractive place for
assembly meetings. Colonel Sam Jarvis wrote to the
governor from New Bern in June 1779: "Your Excellency will
please Excuse Bad writing, as I am much alarmed at the
disorder in town."31
New Bern's dislocation as capital was achieved through
renewed governmental itineracy, fed by the capital's health
problems and military threat. Official sanction of this
dislocation, however, needed the establishment of a state
capital. During and after the Revolution, the debates over
temporary meeting places for the assembly paled in
comparison to the struggle for a permanent capital. The
struggle officially began on 6 December, 1777, when a bill
"for fixing the seat of Government in this State and for
appointing and impowering Commissioners for purchasing
lots of land where to erect the public buildings necessary
for that purpose" was presented in the senate.32 The bill
did not stipulate where this new capital might be located
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and was quickly defeated in the house of commons.33
In February 1779 the struggle resumed, as a 
representative in the house of commons introduced a bill 
"to Establish the seat of Government. . .for erecting public 
buildings and providing proper offices for the public 
officers." Although the bill passed in both houses upon its 
first reading, it was then rejected in the house of 
commons.34 The February debate reappeared in May, when 
house and senate concurred in appointing a commission to 
look for a capital site. The senate speaker explained this 
rejection of itineracy and the call for a permanent 
capital:
Whereas, the holding the General Assembly of 
this State, and the Offices incident thereto, at some 
certain fixed place, at or near the centre thereof, 
would save a considerable Expense to the public and 
tend much to the Ease and advantage of the 
Inhabitants in other Respects as well as for the 
preservation of the public Records,
Resolved, therefore, that two Commissioners 
from each District be appointed by the Present 
Assembly. . .
And that a majority of them view and fix upon 
some place in each of the Counties of Johnston, Wake & 
Chatham, for holding the General Assembly, the most 
commodious, convenient and agreeable to the persons 
who may be drawn thither by attending on the public 
Business, and that they return a fair plan of each 
place with a Description of the natural advantages 
and report the same to the next Assembly.35
Whereas the February capital bill had no geographical
stipulation, the May debate revolved around a site choice
for a permanent capital, convenient to the citizens of
North Carolina and with good natural endowments, echoing
the desires of colonial assemblymen, royal governors, and
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Lords Proprietors. In 1779, however, "at or near the 
centre" meant not only a balance of north and south, but 
also a recognition of the growing west? and so, the 
advocates of this bill restricted the capital site to the 
counties of Johnston, Wake, and Chatham. While an eastern 
bias may still be seen in this concept of centrality, the 
bill proposed a relatively judicious central location 
compared to Tryon* s view of New Bern as "being nearly 
Central."36 Still, the geographical designation provoked 
debate in the senate. Thomas Respass, Jr., of Beaufort 
County "moved that the Words 'or any other place' be added" 
after the designation of the three counties.37 The senate 
rejected this proposal in a close vote— fifteen to twelve. 
The commissioners to choose a site were scheduled to meet 
"on or about" 25 September at Wake County Courthouse, 
receiving five pounds per diem for their services, and to
, t , 70
report their decision to the October assembly.
Two points should be made about the assembly' s May 
action. First, the assembly neither bound itself to the 
commissioners' site choice nor to the act of establishing a 
permanent capital— it only appointed commissioners to 
choose a capital site. The non-commital nature of this bill 
would become obvious in the assembly's actions of October 
1779. Secondly, a hint of sectionalism appeared in the vote 
(see Map 3) . With the exception of Rowan, Franklin, and 














































expanding the capital site search area, while the more 
western regions tended to reject the removal of 
geographical limitation.39 With only 27 of the 47 counties 
voting, however, any geographic interpretation would be 
inconclusive. The geographical implications of the capital 
issue, however, would become strikingly obvious in the fall 
assembly.
When the assembly met that October, Benjamin Seawell, 
senator from Franklin County, presented a bill "to 
establish the Seat of Government" that proved the May 
actions far from conclusive.40 The house of commons 
defeated this new bill by two votes. The requested role- 
call vote demonstrated that the issue of establishing a 
permanent capital divided the counties along distinct 
geographical lines (see Map 4) . The counties voting 
against the bill were all in the eastern part of the state. 
Those voting for the establishment of a capital— with the 
exceptions of Currituck and Bladen— lay further inland.41
North Carolina's long tradition of itinerent government 
may have been influential in the eastern counties 1 
resistance to establishing a new state capital in 1779. 
Itinirent government may have seemed somewhat normal to 
established easterners whose only experience with a 
permanent capital occurred in the decade after 1765. New 
settlers to the back settlements, many migrating from 
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governmental flux. Also, the military threat to eastern 
North Carolina made eastern capital sites unnatractive, and 
perphaps caused eastern representatives to be cautious 
about establishing the seat of government just yet. Such 
theories make Bladen and Currituck's votes especially 
intriguing. Were they both exceptions, or did Bladen 
perhaps represent the geographical front of an ideological 
trend? Fortunately, much more significant role call votes 
occurred later which would give clearer pictures of 
sectionalism in the capital issue.
Between the capital bill's defeat in October 1779 and 
the passage of a similar bill in the spring of 1782, much 
could have happened toward the establishment of a seat of 
government. Lefler and Powell claim that:
[i]n 1781, Hillsborough was chosen as 
the site, but there was much opposition to 
this decision, especially after Governor 
Thomas Burke was taken prisoner by the 
Tories of that town. In a political trade 
by which Alexander Martin was elected 
governor, the law was repealed in 
1782. . . .42
Had an act establishing Hillsborough as capital been 
repealed in such a political trade, the political dealing 
would hearken back to the use of the capital issue in the 
administrations of Johnston and Dobbs. Unfortunately, the 
State Records of North Carolina are silent as to any such 
legislation in 1781 or repeal in 1782. Francis Nash, in 
Hillsboro: Colonial and Revolutionary, makes no mention of
the town being chosen as a capital site in 1781 or of the
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repeal of any such act.43 Likewise, Hugh F. Rankin, in his 
article on "Orange County in the Era of the American 
Revolution" makes no mention of such actions.44
Although direct evidence for Lefler and Powell's 
propositions cannot be presented here, the context of North 
Carolina's situation in 1781 can be examined. New Bern was 
still considered insecure in the face of the British 
threat. Military and administrative correspondance during 
1781 demonstrates the North Carolina's leaders considered 
inland areas generally more secure than coastal regions.45 
This situation would serve a cozy context to Lefler and 
Powell's claim that the inland site of Hillsborough was 
made a capital during that year. Hillsborough, however, 
had problems of its own which made it an unnattractive 
choice. The correspondance of General Sumner demonstrates 
that rumors existed of an enemy presence in the town. "The 
Enemy's van guard," he wrote in February, " is in 
Hillsborough."46
Not everyone shared his concern, however? in that same 
month another military officer wrote that the "News 
Consarning the British at Hilsboro I am perswaided is 
false."47 Yet in April Sumner wrote of the "distressed 
condition" of Hillsborough and in May mentioned that 
smallpox was raging in the town.48 Hillsborough was not a 
prime capital site in 1781 even if it lay inland. In all 
fairness, however, Lefler and Powell did state that the act
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choosing the town as a seat of government was unpopular.
The second part of Lefler and Powell*s proposition— that 
in 1782 the assembly repealed legislation which named 
Hillsborough the seat of government— is more problematic.
In 1782 the legislature concerned itself with passing— not 
repealing— a capital measure. On 25 April 1782 the house 
and senate appointed a joint committee "to prepare and 
bring in a bill for appointing a place at which the General 
Assembly hereafter shall be held."49 Abner Nash, 
representative from Jones County, introduced the "Bill for 
appointing a place for the future meetings of the General 
Assembly" in the house of commons, and both houses had 
passed the bill the necessary three times by 8 May 1782.50 
The assembly passed rather than repealed an act to 
establish the seat of government in 1782.
Hillsborough did play a prominent role in the 1782 
assembly, but not in the manner which Lefler and Powell have 
suggested. Rather than repealing Hillsborough as a capital 
site, the assembly voted to hold the next assembly session 
at that town, and even "enacted that the further General 
Assemblies shall be continued there until a proper place 
shall be chosen for a Seat of Government."51 Not yet ready 
to agree on a permanent capital site, the assembly desired 
to at least end the inconveniences of itinerent government 
by appointing Hillsborough as an official temporary site. 
That same year the assembly legislated to repair
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Hillsborough's public buildings, finding the immediate 
renovation "necessary for the conveniency of transacting 
public business."52 In 1782, Hillsborough's "public 
business" was not seen as merely local.
The act naming Hillsborough as a temporary meeting site 
is significant, for in it the assembly verbalized special 
concerns of the capital issue in a state at war. The "Act 
for appointing a place for the Future Meetings of the 
General Assembly" stipulated:
I. Whereas it is found by experience that 
great and manifest inconveniences have 
arisen to the public, and are daily 
increasing for want of having a proper 
place fixed on for holding the General 
Assembly ?
II. Be it therefore Enacted by the General 
Assembly of the State of North 
Carolina. . . That from and after the 
present session of Assembly, and until a 
proper place shall be fixed on for a seat 
of government by legislative authority, 
the future General Assemblies of this 
State shall be held at the town of 
Hillsborough.53
The act added that should the assembly "have good cause to
apprehend their session is in danger of being interrupted
by the enemy, they may adjourn to any other place of greater
safety."54 Remembering not only enemy threat but also
smallpox epidemics, the act gave the governor authority,
under advice of council, to convene the assembly "to such
other place as he shall judge most proper and convenient"
should Hillsborough "by chance of war fall into hands of the
enemy, or be in imminent danger of falling into their hands,
99 .
or in case any contagious disease should prevail in such a 
place at the time appointed for the meeting of the General 
Assembly."55
Whether or not Hillsborough was ever designated the 
official seat of government, Lefler and Powell, in claiming 
such an act was repealed within a year, hit upon a basic 
fact of North Carolina's capital issue. Until Raleigh was 
established in the 1790's, no capital decision ever lasted 
very long— except perhaps the passive decision for 
inaction. Hillsborough's position as a temporary meeting 
place lasted only until 1784, when the assembly voted to 
convene in New Bern. Even as early as May 1783 other towns 
had been considered for assembly meeting sites. The act for 
appointing a permanent capital site, passed in May 1782, 
had just as short a lifespan. By 10 May 178 3 "a bill for 
repealing an act entitled an act for appointing a place for 
the future meetings of the General Assembly" became law.56 
The repeal passed its final vote in the house of commons by 
only one representative.57 A comparison of this role-call 
vote for repeal to the house vote which passed the 1782 act 
demonstrates a sectional firming in the capital issue (see 
Maps 5 and 6) .58 In 1782, an east-west antagonism surfaced 
in the vote, though many exceptions to this trend appeared 
among the eastern representatives. Bertie, Chowan, and 
Jones Counties voted yea while many of their eastern 
neighbors opposed the bill. Unfortunately, eleven of the
1 0 0  .
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eastern counties did not vote or had unidentifiable votes, 
thus minimizing the significance of any geographical trend. 
The inablity to determine how Brunswick, New Hanover, and 
Bladen Counties would have voted precludes any indication 
of how Cape Fear interests stood on the issue.
All votes are identified in the 1783 repeal vote and 
demonstrate a strengthened sectional trend. Only four 
eastern counties failed to vote, and those that did— with 
the exception of Bladen— voted for repeal. Northampton, 
Halifax, and Nash Counties had conflicting votes from their 
representatives, but they were on the border of the 
emerging sectional blocks. Bertie, Chowan, and Jones fell 
in line with their eastern neighbors, but, surprisingly, so 
did Wake and Johnston.59 Perhaps the representatives of 
these two counties— counties which had been considered as 
capital sites in 1779— sided with their eastern colleagues 
in hopes of postponing any decision on the capital until 
Hillsboro no longer seemed a probable choice.
Comparing these two votes to Maps 3 and 4 suggests some 
conclusions as to the counties' roles in the surfacing 
sectionalism. Bladen County, though close to the coast, 
consistently voted with the more western counties. Its 
neighbors, New Hanover and Duplin, however, consistently 
voted with the eastern counties, thus drawing the 
southeastern sectional line close to the coast. The 
comparison also indicates that Wake's alliance with the
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east in 178 3 was perhaps just an aberration. The counties 
which showed a trend of inconsistency— Johnston, Nash, 
Franklin, Halifax— demonstrate that the edge of 
sectionalism was unclear north of Duplin County.
A danger exists in viewing the outcome of capital bills
in North Carolina as clear demonstrations of the popularity
of establishing a seat of government. The recurrent
questions and close votes prove the capital issue to be an
ongoing debate. Former governor Richard Caswell wrote to
his son William in May 1783 about the "Bill to repeal the
Hillsboro1 Act for fixing the Seat of Government."60 What he
called the "Hillsboro1 Act" was not the act establishing
that town as a temporary meeting site, but the act
establishing a permanent seat of government— passed at
Hillsborough— without regard to a specific site. In his
letter, Caswell strikingly added:
& tomorrow 1 tis said a Bill will be 
introduced for Building Public offices & 
directing public officers to reside there, 
this is to fix the seat of Government when 
the Buildings are erected. Wake & X Creek 
are talked of. X Creek & Newbern will be in 
dispute for the next meeting of Assembly.61
While the assembly repealed an act establishing the seat of
government, forces in the assembly for establishing a
capital were very much in play. No new action toward a
capital passed again, however, until 1788.
Despite lack of definitive action in 1784, the capital 
issue attracted much debate. Richard Caswell wrote in
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April 1784 that there was "Much talk about the seat of
Government, I believe if its Attempted Fayetteville,
Tarboro & this place [Hillsborough] will be in
nomination.1,62 In May he wrote to his son that
New modes of Courts, Court Laws & Judges 
are much talked of as well as fixing the 
Seat of Government. Tarboro' &
Fayetteville seem, at present, to have the 
advantage & will be opposed to each other.63
Later that month, the senate proposed that "the General
Assembly ballot immediately for the place where the seat of
Government shall be fixed."64 The senate nominated Tarboro,
Fayetteville, Smithfield, and "the plantation of Mr. John
Abernathie in Wake County" as possible capital sites.65 The
house agreed to ballot for a site choice, but none of the
places nominated won a majority in both houses, so the
assembly postponed the capital issue "until a later day."66
Richard Caswell described this situation to his son,
William. After writing of the close contest between
Hillsborough and New Bern for the next assembly site (New
Bern was to win) , he then explained:
much has been done towards fixing the Seat 
of Government but a few Neuse Men have 
hitherto put a Stop to it. Tarboro was 
within three of a Majority one in three 
Times Voting. Fayetteville was in 
Competition. We had for Smithfield in the 
Course of the Three times polling 18, 13 &
17 which effectually has yet stopped their 
farther progress, Indeed I do not know if 
it will be again attempted.67
Caswell blamed "a few Neuse Men" for the general assembly's
failure to establish a capital. On one level his remark was
105
too simplistic: other areas besides the Neuse River region
voted against capital bills. Why Caswell had this 
perception, however, deserves explanation. Who were Neuse 
men? The counties actually touched by the Neuse River were 
Carteret, Craven, Dobbs, Wayne, Johnston, Wake, and— at the 
river's source— Orange. Neuse tributaries touched Jones, 
Pitt, Edgecombe, Nash, and Franklin Counties. In the three 
role-call votes on whether or not to establish a capital 
(Maps 4-6), Johnston, Wake, Orange, Jones, and Nash 
Counties were not consistently allied with other eastern 
counties in opposition to capital measures. In the house 
vote of 10 May 1783, however, the counties touching the 
Neuse— with the exception of Orange— all joined to favor 
repeal of the capital act. Of the total Neuse River system, 
only Nash, Franklin, and Orange Counties opposed repeal. 
Perhaps a coalition of Neuse representatives were the 
driving force in the push for repeal, and perhaps in 1784 —  
even more speculative, as there was no role-call vote—  
Neuse men worked against a majority vote in balloting for a 
capital site. Sites within the Neuse region, however, were 
nominated for the balloting. Caswell may have meant that 
Neuse men defeated any majority decision by competing among 
themselves and with others.
A role-call vote on the capital issue does exist for 
December 1785, over a year after Caswell's comment on the 


















































































































keeping the principal offices of State in the Town of 
Hillsborough" upon its first reading by a close vote (41 to
zo ,
37) . A geographical analysis of this vote (see Map 7) 
shows many exceptions to the sectional trend that had 
developed. While Currituck County voted opposite its 
eastern neighbors, Davidson and Surry cast votes opposing 
the Hillsborough seat of government. More significant 
developments occurred in the southern half of the state. 
While Bladen and New Hanover stood with their previous 
positions of siding with west and east respectively, the 
other counties of the Cape Fear Valley demonstrated mixed 
views on the bill. Most striking were the votes of Duplin 
and Sampson in support of the bill, for the parent county of 
Duplin had consistently sided with the eastern counties in
ZQ
the past. Through the 1785 vote significance can be seen 
in Richard Caswells label "Neuse men". He chose a major 
river for his label— a river economically rivaled by the 
Cape Fear River to the south. The counties of the Cape Fear 
system (Brunswick, New Hanover, Bladen, Duplin, Sampson, 
Cumberland, Moore, Chatham, Randolph, Orange, and 
Guilford), taken together, began showing flux on the 
capital issue while counties in the northeast had become 
more unified in opposition to the west. A break between 
northeast and southeast was formalizing. In the last half 
of the 1780's, this difference would dramatically gel to 
present a state clearly divided on the capital issue along
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the lines of two river systems.
The 1785 vote also demonstrated the beginning of a quite
different trend in the geographical sectionalism of the
capital issue. For the first time, a far-western county—
Davidson— cast a vote in alliance with the northeastern
sector, opposing state offices at Hillsborough. This was
no fluke, for votes in the far west continued to conform
with the northeastern faction. Representatives in these
western counties demonstrated, in a "Petition of the
Inhabitants of the Western Country," special concerns about
the capital issue. The petition, written in December 1787,
defended the westerners' desire for a separate state
government. One defense concerned the remoteness of the
North Carolina seat of government (such as it was) :
We earnestly request that an impartial 
view of our remoteness might be taken into 
consideration. The great inconveniency 
attending your seat of Government, and 
also the great difficulty in ruling well & 
giving protection to so remote a people.
To say nothing of the almost impassable 
mountains, which renders it impracticable 
for us to furnish ourselves with a bare 
load of the necessaries of life, except we 
in the first instance travel from one to 
two hundred & more miles through some other 
State ' ere we can reach your government.70
Debates over such sites as Cross Creek, Tarboro,
Hillsborough, Smithfield, and Wake County did not offer
these western residents much hope of a convenient seat of
government. It is thus understandable that the far-western
representatives had a more ambivalent view of the capital
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issue than did the representatives east of the mountains.
The year of this western petition— 1787— was again 
marked by defeated actions toward establishing a seat of 
government. In January the house of commons rejected a 
"Resolve. . . declaring the offices of the Treasurer, 
Comptroller and Secretary shall be kept at Hillsborough" on 
the grounds of "useless expense."71 A December attempt at 
fixing the residence of the officers of Government, & the 
place for the meeting of the future General Assemblies" was 
"ordered to lie over until the next Assembly."72
North Carolina did not see any more definite action 
toward the establishment of a capital until the meeting of 
the North Carolina convention at Hillsborough during the 
summer of 1788. The state government had weathered the 
Revolution without a seat, and was to continue functioning 
without a capital for several more years. By 1788, enemy 
threat was long behind the leaders of this state, yet their 
government continued itinerantly, their debates about a 
site persisted, and their feet drug on the capital issue as 
ever before. The convention of 1788, however, would show a 
significant turn of events in the debate despite firming of 
the already-emerging sectional lines.
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CHAPTER V
"UNTIL A LATER DAY"
POSTPONEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF THE CAPITAL DISPUTE, 1788-1791
North Carolina's general assembly gave the 1788 
convention authority to decide several pertinent issues, 
including the choice of a capital site. The convention's 
voting on the capital issue demonstrated a final 
crystalization of sectionalism along river lines, with the 
Neuse Basin serving as the southern front of a northeastern 
pact. Strategic Wake County made a final decision to ally 
itself with its Neuse neighbors, while the Cape Fear 
Valley, from Moore County to Brunswick and New Hanover, 
showed a strengthened unity in its opposition to the 
northeast and its alliance with the west. The events of the 
convention's debate, however, caused a reversal of the two 
section's stands on the establishment of the seat of 
government, which, in turn, led to a new drive to postpone 
the coming of a permanent capital.
On 31 July, 1788, Griffith Rutherford of Rowan County, 
seconded by John Steele of Salisbury, moved that the 
convention "proceed to fix on a proper place for the seat of 
government."1 When the measure passed, John G. Blount of 
Beaufort County "moved for leave to enter a protest. . . 
against the above resolution."2 The next day, Blount
114 .
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paradoxically voted to ballot for the capital site. His 
strange action seems at first typical of the overall 
geographical distribution of the vote, which was fraught 
with exceptions to the previous sectional trends (see Map 
8) . Fifteen counties, ranging the length of the state, 
offered conflicting votes from among their 
representatives.3
The resolution to ballot for a capital site passed in 
this strange morass of votes, but the nature of the 
convention's voting concealed a continued, and even 
strengthened sectionalism on the capital issue. The 
convention allowed each county five representatives 
(rather than two as in the assembly's house of commons) with 
the additional customary representation of certain towns. 
The large number of representatives made for an unusually 
high number of conflicting votes within counties. If, 
however, only the majority votes of those counties having 
three or more representatives in agreement are considered, 
a quite different map emerges (see map 9) . All but two 
counties— Dobbs and Carteret— participated in the vote, 
and of the participants only Sumner and Beaufort did not 
have at least three representatives in agreement. Mapping 
only those majority votes demonstrates the previous 
sectional trend still strongly present in 1788, with a 
clear northeastern sector battling the establishment of a 
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region. Most intriguing was the eastward leaning of 
Caswell and Chatham counties. Of the Neuse Basin counties, 
Jones alone did not fall in line. The capital issue began 
in the 1788 convention along the same sectional lines which 
had evolved during the previous decade.
The events of 2 August 1788, however, dramatically and 
permanently reversed the sections' respective stands on the 
capital issue. The convention resolved that it "would not 
fix the seat of government at any one particular point; but 
that it will be left at the discretion of the Assembly to 
ascertain the exact spot" within "ten miles of the point or 
place determined by this Convention."4 Representatives 
nominated Smithfield, Tarboro, Fayetteville, New Bern, 
Hillsborough, the fork of the Haw and Deep Rivers (see Map 
2) , and Isaac Hunter's plantation in Wake County. At first 
no site won a majority of votes, but on a second ballot "Mr. 
Isaac Hunter's, in Wake county", was "fixed upon" by a slim 
majority of five votes.5 The outcome aroused protest, and 
the convention ordered "That such of the members of this 
convention, as may think proper, have leave to enter their 
protest on the journal against the ordinance for 
establishing the seat of government."6
On 4 August William Barry Grove of Cumberland County 
presented an official protest, signed by 119 members of the 
convention, which attacked the decision for Wake County on 
several grounds. First, they denounced the wisdom of
119 .
choosing a non-urban site:
Dissentient.— Because the establishment 
of a seat of government in a place 
unconnected with commerce, and where there 
is at present no town, will be attended 
with a heavy expence to the people, and the 
town when established never can rise above 
the degree of a village: The experience of
Virginia and Maryland have given a 
striking proof of this in the towns of 
* Williamsburg and Annapolis.7
Would Grove and his colleagues would have protested had a
rural site in Cumberland County been selected?
The dissentients ended their protest by arguing that the 
designation of a ten-mile radius rather than an exact spot 
went against the instructions of the general assembly.
They complained:
Because we conceive the place fixed on is 
not authorized by the resolution of the 
General Assembly, under whose 
recommendation the convention met, as that 
resolution says 'the convention shall fix 
on a particular place? ' whereas by a 
resolution of the convention a latitude is 
given of twenty miles to a given spot, and 
the appointment or selection of the 
identical spot now reverts to the 
Legislature, contrary to the spirit and 
meaning of the constitution.8
One again might ask whether these men would have been
happier had "a particular place" in Wake County been
chosen.
The heart of the signed convention protest, however, 
appropriately appeared between these two arguments. In 
this middle section the dissentients clearly demonstrated 
sectional antagonism over the capital issue to be built
1 2 0  .
upon the factors of trade and economic competion. They 
opposed Wake County:
Because the establishment of the seat of 
government at Fayetteville would have a 
great and instantaneous effect upon the 
decayed commerce of this country, by 
holding out immediate advantage to those 
who are imployed in the culture of tobacco 
and other valuable articles of export, the 
principal part of which is now exported 
from Virginia and South Carolina.9
These men had hoped that a capital on the Cape Fear River,
such as Fayetteville, would strengthen the trade nexus
connecting the Cape Fear ports and the back country. Much
of the western area did not lie in the Cape Fear basin at
all, but was drained by rivers which flowed to South
Carolina ports. Because of the poor navigability of North
Carolina ports (especially in the sounds, but also, to a
lesser degree, at the mouth of the Cape Fear) trade was also
routed north to Virginia. The protesters claimed concern
for increasing the state's competitive standing with these
other trade networks. They also sought to strengthen their
relative standing against trade through the sounds (the
Neuse River northward) . Neuse and Albemarle interests
would have likewise desired the capital to be in their
sector so as to strengthen their trade. Both factions would
have sensed their own trading interests weakened if the
other section won the capital site.
A geographic analysis of the dissentients confirms a 
sectional alliance between the Cape Fear region and the
1 2 1  .
back country (see Map 10) . Of the 119 signers, the counties 
of representation for all but one can be identified.
Without exception, the protestors hailed from the Cape Fear 
Valley and the western counties. Of the counties in the 
Neuse River system, only Orange protested, though it must
be remembered that this county lay in both river systems and
• 10 probably had closer ties to the Cape Fear region. These
sections which protested the balloting result were the same
ones which strongly favored balloting for a site on 1
August. Clearly, they had not expected a Neuse River site
to win a majority.
After the convention committed North Carolina to a Wake 
County capital, the struggle returned to the general 
assembly along the same sectional lines, but with the 
ideology of struggle for each side reversed. From 1788 
through 1790 the northeastern representatives fought to 
carry into effect the ordinance of the convention, while 
the remainder of the representatives generally fought to 
prevent the establishment of the seat of government (see 
Maps 11 through 15) . The far-western counties proved to be 
consistently ambivalent on the capital issue for the 
remainder of their existence within the state.
The struggle during those three years became quite 
repetitious. In November 1788 the Cape Fear and western 
representatives succeeded in postponing attempts "to carry 
into effect the ordinance of the Convention," causing this
1 2 2  .
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bill to "lie over until the next General Assembly" (see Map 
ll)11 In the fall of 1789, forces of opposition actually 
defeated this same bill on its second reading in the house 
of commons (see Map 12) .12 Later that session, a "bill to 
appoint Commissioners for carrying into effect " the 
convention1 s ordinance was defeated by one vote in the same 
house (see Map 13) . Although the house agreed to reconsider 
the bill, it was again "negatived.1,13 The northeastern 
faction— with the exceptions of Northampton and Jones 
Counties— united behind the measure. In both 1788 and 1789 
the votes demonstrated that the seat of government was a 
sectional issue.
The sectional struggle continued in the November 1790 
session of the general assembly and climaxed in extremely 
close role-call votes in both houses on the same day. This 
session met at Fayetteville, and The North-Carolina 
Chronicle; or. Fayetteville Gazette set the stage for the 
renewed capital debate. Its 15 November article on the 
governor's address to the assembly included this editorial 
note:
The following is inserted by the 
particular desire of a member of the 
general assembly:— It is to be lamented 
that among the several matters of a public 
nature, recommended by his excellency to 
the consideration of the general assembly, 
he had entirely forgot, or neglected, the 
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The governor likely wished he could forget. It is tempting 
to speculate about a northeastern representative 
submitting this jab to a Fayetteville newspaper. What 
matters, however, is that the assembly did not forget the 
convention ordinance. On the same day this news article 
appeared, a representative from Warren County received 
"leave to bring in a bill to carry into effect the ordinance 
of the Convention held at Hillsborough. . . entitled fAn 
ordinance for establishing a place for holding the future 
meetings of the General Assembly. 11,15
By 25 November, both houses had passed the bill once and 
were preparing for the second reading.16 In the house of 
commons:
The bill. . . was read the second time, 
amended, and the question being put,
*Shall this bill pass?1 being objected to, 
the house divided, and there were for the 
passage fifty-one, and against it fifty- 
one; whereupon the Speaker gave his vote 
and pronounced the passage of the bill.17
The subsequent role call of votes, in which all counties
participated and all voters were identifiable, gave the
clearest picture yet of capital sectionalism (see Map 14) .
The only two counties divided in vote were Orange and
Caswell— by their geographical position understandably
torn between the two factions. As for the rest, the vote
• • • 1 Ashowed a state divided between two river systems.
The senate then defeated the bill in an equally close 
vote. In that house:



















second time, was put on its passage:
Whereupon, there being an equal number of 
votes for and against the passing of the 
said bill, the Speaker was called on, who 
gave the casting vote and declared that the 
bill should be rejected; and the same was 
rejected accordingly.19
A senator requested a role-call vote, and all the
senatorial votes were identifiable. The geographical
interpretation of this second vote, however, was marred by
the nonparticipation of six counties (see Map 15) . Still,
the senate clearly reflected the same sectionalism apparent
• 20 in the house.
The senate journal*s record of the vote, however, 
reavealed an intriguing problem. The senate declared 
twenty-four votes for the bill and twenty-four against, but 
only twenty-three names were recorded "Against the passage 
of this bill." These names were followed by the written 
sum, "24" .21 If the clerk accurately recorded these names, 
then the bill should have passed its second reading in the 
senate as it had in the house, and the speaker should not 
have been allowed to enter his opposing vote to the measure.
The suspiciousness of the 1790 senate vote perhaps 
indicated the sharpness of the sectional dispute on the 
capital issue. The closeness of both votes certainly did. 
Another indication of sharp sectionalism in that session 
was the vote on the site of the next general assembly. The 
votes divided equally— 75 to 75— between Fayetteville and 
New Bern.22 On a reballoting, the town on the Cape Fear lost
130 .
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to the town on the Neuse, but the sectional statement was 
clear.
Although the Cape Fear and the western sections of the 
state fought against the enforcement of the convention's 
capital ordinance, it is important to realize that they did 
not actively attempt to overthrow that ordinance. Rather, 
in their actions there existed a sense of merely postponing 
the inevitable— or perhaps of buying time while waiting for 
a change in situation. In 1790 the southern and western 
sectors won postponement, but the sucess was short-lived. 
That same year, the northeastern faction won its choice of 
New Bern as the next assembly site; in 1791 they would win 
their choice of Wake County as the permanent capital site. 
Elizabeth Culbertson Waugh describes the final enforcement 
of the convention's ordinance: on 5 December 1791 nine
commissioners were chosen to select an exact site in Wake 
County from numerous land tracts offered for sale. The 
commissioners chose a site on Colonel Joel Lane's property, 
the government buying one thousand acres from him for 
1,378. This site, later named Raleigh, would become North 
Carolina's long-debated permanent seat of government.23
With the selection of Joel Lane's site, the long 
evolution of North Carolina's capital issue had reached an 
end. Many of the factors of debate had changed form and 
relative importance between the seventeenth century and 
1791. The Lords Proprietors were especially concerned with
132 .
convenience and healthiness in a capital site. These 
factors played prominent roles in the debate during 
Johnston and Dobbs's administrations, but after Tryon 
neither seemed of great significance. Smallpox epidemics 
influenced assembly meeting sites and probably made certain 
towns unnatractive as potential capital sites, but little 
concern appeared in the later period for the inherent 
healthiness of sites. Convenience was perhaps the most 
driving issue before Tryon's administration. Except for 
the far-western counties, however, it did not appear so 
significant after New Bern's fall from capital status. To 
what extent convenience played a silent role in later 
capital debates would be hard to determine. The system of 
alliances and the sectional blocs that occurred, however, 
made it fairly clear that economics played a more 
significant role than convenience in the last decade of 
debate. Under Johnston and Dobbs economic interests in the 
capital debate were localized? Dobbs's interest in Tower 
Hill and the New Bern/Wilmington rivarly both lacked the 
support of strong regional alliances. After the 
Revolution, however, the maturing of North Carolina trade 
systems enabled an alliance of Cape Fear and western 
interests against the interests of the northeast river 
systems. Representatives of each of the two sections 
supported capital sites which, although not necessarily 
near, were commercially advantageous.
133 .
Sectionalism had been apparent in the capital issue 
since Burrington1s administration. Indeed, sectionalism 
was to be the one constant factor. Ekirch distinguishes 
periods in the eighteenth century when sectional antagonism 
waned. Seen through the window of the capital issue, 
however, sectionalism reigned continuously, except for a 
brief respite under Tryon when a New Bern capital became 
established fact. Like the relative significance of the 
issues, however, sectionalism itself evolved through the 
eighteenth century. Under Burrington, Johnston, and Dobbs, 
sectionalism meant conflict between the Cape Fear and 
Albemarle regions, with the Neuse River region too unstable 
to be considered an ally to either side. From the official 
establishment of a capital at New Bern through the 
Revolution a weaker sectionalism appeared between east and 
west-— with the coastal Cape Fear region allied to the more 
northerly eastern areas. By 1788, however, the 
southeastern coast joined inland Cape Fear in alliance with 
the back country. This alliance opposed a newly firmed 
coalition of Neuse River Valley and Albemarle interests. 
Although the face of sectionalism evolved, the capital 
issue showed North Carolina to be marked by this divisive 
force throughout the eighteenth century.
This study has left unanswered many questions about the 
seat of government debate. Especially intriguing is the 
relationship-between North Carolina's experience and that
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of other colonies and states. This turbulent and unsettled 
capital situation may at first seem unique. A fuller study 
which included the capital issue in other colonies or 
states would not only aid in determining North Carolina's 
uniqueness, but also help explain why this state 
experienced such a flux. Donald L. Kemmerer describes a 
situation in colonial New Jersey which bore striking 
resemblance to North Carolina's quandary. Proprietary New 
Jersey was divided into East Jersey and West Jersey, and 
these separate identities were maintained partly by 
alternating legislatures between Perth Amboy and 
Burlington— -the chief towns of these sections— and equal 
assembly representation. Kemmerer describes a political 
measure in 1710 which declared Burlington the sole capital. 
The assembly ignored the measure and continued alternating 
meeting sites.24 By the 1720's North Carolina had two 
specific geographical regions which, though lacking the 
Jersey's individual political identities, possessed 
political equality through the domination of the executive 
branch by Cape Fear interests and the legislative branch by 
Albemarle men.
In the Cape Fear, North Carolina had a politically 
strong "back country" even early on in the eighteenth 
century, if the term could be applied to a coastal region. 
As the actual back countries developed throughout the 
colonies and became politically stronger in the
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revolutionary era, colonies other than New Jersy showed
situations similar to North Carolina's capital debate.
Virginius Dabney strikes a familiar chord in this
description of Virginia's struggle to choose a new capital:
Agitation for removal of the seat of 
government from Williamsburg to a more 
central location had been heard for 
decades, especially after the capital 
there was destroyed by fire in 1747.
Finally, in 1779 the General Assembly 
decided to move, but Richmond was chosen by 
only a slight majority . . . .25
The Revolution brought flux to Georgia's capital situation
as well. Savannah was the colony's early and undisputed
capital. Kenneth Coleman describes that "[w]hile Savannah
again became the capital in 1782, the increased importance
of Augusta and the upcountry led the executive (governor
and council) to reside there part time and the assembly to
alternate between the two cities."26 Perhaps North Carolina
and New Jersey were somewhat ahead of the game in their
early governmental itineracy. They each had to balance two
politically strong yet geographically distinct regions
before the maturation of western back countries in the
colonies.
This study also does not explain many specific workings 
of North Carolina's capital debate, especially in the era 
of Revolution. How did the assembly coalesce on Tryon's 
choice of New Bern in 1766 or on the final choice of Joel 
Lane's property in 1791? What factors caused the far- 
Western representatives to vote for or against capital
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bills? Why did the many exceptions to the developing 
sectional trends appear? How did such a strong alliance 
between the back country and the Cape Fear region emerge 
when so much of the former's trade lay in South Carolina? 
These questions could possibly be answered in a more 
comprehensive study. More importantly, the answers to 
these and other significant questions could be clarified in 
a study which involved more personally the people of the 
debate. Not only is a study of the voting assemblymen 
needed, but also a study of their immediate societies which 
influenced how they viewed sectionalism and how they voted 
on issues affecting the capital. Real meaning in this 
political debate is lost without examining the social 
foundations on which assembly votes were erected.
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